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This work is an introduction to modern cryptology built within an algebraic framework, rather
than a number theoretic one. Working within algebra, historic shift cyphers (such as the Caesar
cypher) shall be studied and expanded. Recent exponential cyphers including public-key cyphers
will be studied. Finally, a survey of methods of solving the arithmetic problems that form the
basis of public-key cryptosystems will be offered.
In addition to the cyphers, methods of breaking them will be studied along side the cyphers
and statistical analyses of the different attacks will be provided.
1.2. BACKGROUND CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.2 Background
The material presented herein is done so with the expectation of a solid grounding in basic
finite algebra. A basic understanding of finite group theory, finite ring theory, and finite fields is
expected; A more detailed understanding will be helpful. An undergraduate level understanding
of number theory is also expected of the reader.
The rings of integers mod l will be very frequently used, as will their groups of units. This
includes the fields of integers mod p, for prime p. Since binary data is under study, finite fields
with a characteristic of 2 will also be seen.
1.3 Conventions and Notations
For the purposes of this work, zero shall be considered a natural number (0 ∈ N). When
necessary, the set of natural numbers excluding zero shall be denoted as N∗.
The base-10 logarithm, log10, shall be denoted as log. The natural logarithm, loge, shall be
denoted as ln. The base-2 logarithm, log2, shall be denoted as lg.
Numbers may be represented in bases other than 10 at various times. Bases of 2 and 10
are standard and when the context provides clarity numbers written in those bases will be
done so with no special notation, otherwise base-2 numbers shall be followed with a subscript
of 2: 101 = 11001012. When a number is written in a non-standard base, each digit will be
written in base 10 unless otherwise noted, with a colon ‘:’ separating each digit. For example,
1383 = 7 · 142 + 0 · 14 + 11, it would be expressed in base 14 as 7:0:11. This notation mimics
the common notation for time in the United States, which uses a base of 60 for the minutes and
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seconds digits.
The ring of integers mod n shall be represented as Zn. Finite fields shall be denoted by
Fq or Zp for a prime p. The multiplicative group of units of a ring shall be denoted with the
postfix, unary, * operator: R∗.
The R-module of n-dimensional vectors over R shall be denoted by Rn. The R-module of
m× n matrices over R shall be denoted by Rm×n.
The ring of n × n matrices over a ring, R, shall be denoted as Mn(R). The multiplicative
group of invertible n×n matrices over a ring may be denoted with the * operator or by GLn(R).
1.4 Overview
Data encryption through cyphers is an ancient form of security that has been relied on to protect
information for thousands of years. Julius Caesar used them to communicate securely with his
officers. One of the greatest victories of the Allied forces over Nazi Germany in World War II
is the breaking of The Enigma, Germany’s secret military code.1 Today, many governments,
corporations, and individuals rely on data encryption to secure data.
Initially, cyphers worked by operating on letters of the alphabet. Each letter in an original
message was replaced with another letter of the alphabet. Decyphering the secret message
merely required knowing the original substitutions and applying the inverse substitution. The
Caesar Cypher was one of these where every letter was replaced by the one three positions later
1For a short description of Germany’s Enigma machine, which used permutation cyphers, see Hardy, pp
81-86. [2]
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in the alphabet. Decyphering messages with the Caesar Cypher worked by substituting each
letter in the secret message with the one three positions earlier in the alphabet.
It quickly becomes advantageous to associate each letter or other character with a unique
numerical value so encyphering and decyphering can be described with analytic functions. With
this, cyphers realized by addition, like the Caesar Cypher, can be expanded to cyphers using
multiplication on the initial characters, like the linear cyphers. Exponentiation can also be added
to the list of possible operations to perform on the characters of the message to be encyphered.
Since these operations are valid in any ring, the characters of the messages need not necessarily
be associated with numbers, per se, but may be associated with unique elements of any ring of
an appropriate size.
Each style of encryption will have aspects that can be analyzed: speed, or computational
complexity, of encryption and decryption, as well as ease, or not, of a third party breaking the
cypher.
1.5 General Definitions
Encyphering is always performed by the application of an invertible transformation f : P → C.
Decyphering, therefore, is achieved by applying the inverse transformation f−1. The original,
legible message is referred to as plaintext, P , and the result is referred to as cyphertext, C.
Definition 1.1 (plaintext, P ). The standard, userland data. This may be a text message (i.e.
email) or a binary or text computer file (JPEG, ZIP, INI, etc...) or object.
Definition 1.2 (P). The set of all possible plaintexts for a given transformation f , its domain.
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Definition 1.3 (cyphertext, C). The result of applying a transformation f to a plaintext P ∈ P,
f(P ).
Definition 1.4 (C). The set of all possible cyphertexts, f(P).
Definition 1.5 (encypher). The act of applying a transformation f to a plaintext P ∈ P
resulting in a cyphertext C ∈ C.
Definition 1.6 (decypher). The act of applying the inverse f−1 of an encyphering transforma-
tion to cyphertext resulting in plaintext.
In practice, encyphering a plaintext is expected to conceal its contents, but these definitions
do not exclude the identity function f(x) = x as the transformation. Different encryption
schemes will provide different degrees of obfuscation of the original plaintext.
Definition 1.7 (encryption scheme). A family of related invertible transformations, each dif-
fering only in the value of the parameters used.
Definition 1.8 (key). The values used for the parameters of an encryption scheme in a partic-
ular instance.
1.6 Bit Operations and Big-O Notation
1.6.1 Overview
Computers work in binary. Each binary digit is called a bit. The time a computer would spend
running a certain algorithm is measured in bit operations, and this time is usually expressed as
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a function of the input, or of the size of the input. Since all (classical) computers are built on
the same engineering fundamentals, the actual number of bit operations required on a specific
processor will not vary significantly from properly calculated theoretical values. What can vary
significantly from one computer to another, is the number of bit operations it can perform in a
given amount of real time. This significant variance in the powers of computers is the primary
motivation for using bit operations as the unit of measurement for the time of an algorithm,
rather than a unit of clock time like seconds.
Rather than being concerned with the exact number of bit operations required for a specific
input, it is usually more important to know how the time required changes with regard to the
input When the size of an input to a procedure doubles, it is most desirable to know whether
the time required for the procedure will double with it, or increase 4-fold, or square, or increase
by only a small percentage or not change at all. This information is the focus of the Big-O
notation.
Definition 1.9 (Big-O notation). If f, g : N∗ → R>, it is said that f = O(g), “f is on the order
of g,” if there exists a non-zero constant c such that f(n) ≤ cg(n) for all n.
Example 1.10. The following are all true.







2. 2n2 + 4n = O(n2)
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Big-O notation is small and simple, and shows nicely the time complexity of a process as a
function of the size of its input.
The following simplification and extension will make Big-O notation even easier and more
helpful. First, there may be multiple inputs to a given procedure, so that will be taken into
account. Second, on very small inputs smaller order aspects of a procedure may dominate
the time requirement, but since that time requirement will be so small it will not be of any
concern. The time required to complete large tasks is of primary concern. For example, the
time required for a computer to add two 2-digit numbers might be dedicated primarily to system
overhead, such as memory access. It may take essentially the same amount of time to add two
2-digit numbers as two 15-digit numbers. But perhaps the overhead involved starts requiring
proportionally shorter time as the size of addends increases above 15 digits so that it is negligible
for the addition of two 200-digit numbers. It won’t be important about how the time required
increased going from 1-digit to 15-digit addition; what is important is how the time required
increases going from 100-digit addition to 1000-digit addition.
While in practice any addition takes a minuscule amount of real time, algorithms other
than addition will be analyzed, for which only the time required for larger situations will be
important. The following redefinition of Big-O notation will make it more extensible and more
forgiving of quirky behavior on small problems.
Definition 1.11 (Big-O notation). If f, g : N∗m → R>, it is said that f = O(g), “f is on the
order of g,” if there exists a non-zero constant c and a vector b ∈ N∗m such that f(n) ≤ cg(n)
for all n ∈ N∗m where ni ≥ bi for all i ≤ m.
In this way, Big-O notation will describe the time behavior of an algorithm when the inputs
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are “big enough.”
1.6.2 Time Estimates for Integer Arithmetic
Addition and Subtraction
When counting the time required to add two integers, m and n, it can be assumed without
loss of generality than m ≥ n. Integer addition is performed digit-by-digit starting with the
least significant digit, the ones digit. In each digit operation, the two corresponding digits are
summed along with any carry digit from the previous digit. The least significant digit of the
result is the corresponding digit of the sum, and the other digits are carried to the next digit’s
summation.
The number of digit operations is equal to the larger of the number of digits of m and the
number of digits of n. Since it was presumed that m ≥ n, then m will have the greater (or
same) number of digits, logm + 1. Since logm + 1 = O(logm), then it can be said that the
time required to add a smaller integer to m is O(logm). It is also said that addition takes
logarithmic time with respect to the summands, or linear time with respect to the number of
digits, or length, of the summands.
Computers work in binary (base 2), so it could be said that a computer takes O(lgm) bit
operations. However, O(logm) and O(lgm) are equivalent since the two functions only differ
by a constant multiple, as specified by the logarithm change of base formula, so either one is
correct no matter who or what is doing the addition. Subtraction, which is performed internally
by computers in a very similar fashion to addition, similarly requires O(lgm) time. Specifically,
subtraction is performed by first converting the subtrahend, n, into its opposite in O(lgn) time,
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then adding −n to m in O(lgm) time.
Multiplication and Division
Multiplication is performed by computers in a manner that could be called repeated doubling.
A running total is initialized to a value of zero; At the end this running total will hold the result
of mn. For each bit (binary digit) of n, if 2i is the place value of that bit, and that bit of n is a
one, then the running total is incremented by 2im.
Example 1.12. The method of multiplying two integers shall be illustrated with n = 11 = 10112
and m = 26 = 110102
i n 2im Running total
1011 0 0
0 1011 11010 11010
1 1011 110100 1001110
2 1011 1101000 1001110
3 1011 11010000 100011110
1000111102 = 256 + 16 + 8 + 4 + 2 = 286, which is 11× 26.
Theorem 1.13. Multiplication of two positive integers, m and n, requires O(lgm lgn) time.
Proof. It may be assumed without loss of generality that m ≥ n. For each bit of n, of which
there are O(lgn), an O(lg(mn))-digit addition may be performed. So the total time required is
O(lgn)O(lg(mn)) = O(lgn)O(lgm+ lgn) = O(lgn)O(lgm) = O(lgm lgn).
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In this sense, multiplication can be said to take quadratic time with respect to the lenth
of the factors. More generally, an algorithm that runs in a time as a power of the logarithm of
the size of the inputs, O((lgn)α), is said to run in polynomial time and one that runs in a
time as a power of the size of the inputs, O(nα), is said to run in exponential time.
Integer division is performed in a parallel, though opposite, fashion to multiplication, utiliz-
ing repeated doubling and halving to speed up the process of repeated subtraction. Two running
values are maintained: one will end up as the quotient and the second will be the remainder.
Thus if both the quotient and remainder are desired, only one operation is required.
Suppose the results of m ÷ n (integer quotient) and/or m mod n (remainder) are desired
for some given pair of integers m and n. First, the running values are initialized: the one to end
as m ÷ n, q, to 0 and the one to end as m mod n, r, as m. Second, the largest integer i such
that 2in ≤ m is identified. If i < 0 then nothing further need be done; m = qn+ r with r < n
already. Assuming i ≥ 0, 2i is added to the quotient running total, q, while 2in is subtracted
from the remainder running total, r, then the next largest i is found such that 2in is less than
or equal to the remainder running total. This process continues until i < 0, at which point the
running values will contain the proper quotient and remainder. In practice, the first i is found
by doubling n until n > m then dropping back one step. Each following i is then found by
halving n until n is less than or equal to the remainder counter.
Example 1.14. The method of dividing two integers shall be illustrated with n = 11 = 10112
and m = 300 = 1001011002.
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i n Remainder Quotient
0 1011 100101100 0
1 10110 100101100 0
2 101100 100101100 0
3 1011000 100101100 0
4 10110000 100101100 0
5 101100000 100101100 0
4 10110000 1111100 10000
3 1011000 100100 11000
2 101100 100100 11000
1 10110 1110 11010
0 1011 11 11011
112 = 3, and 110112 = 27, and 300 = 27 ∗ 11 + 3.
Theorem 1.15. m÷ n and m mod n require O(lgm lgn) time (assuming m ≥ n > 0).
Proof. First, the initial i is found in O(lgm− lgn) = O(lgm) steps. Second, for each of O(lgm)
iterations, a subtraction with O(lgn) non-trivial bits is performed. The total time consumed is
O(lgm) +O(lgm)O(lgn) = O(lgm lgn).
Exponentiation
Exponentiation is performed in a manner parallel to the repeated doubling of multiplication, by
a procedure referred to as repeated squaring. To evaluate am, a running product is initialized
11
1.6. BIT OPERATIONS AND BIG-O NOTATION CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
to 1, then for each bit of m, if 2i is the place value of that bit, and that bit of m is a one, then
the running product is multiplied by a2i .
Example 1.16. The repeated squaring method of exponentiation shall be illustrated with




0 1101 15 15
1 1101 225 15
2 1101 50625 759375
3 1101 2562890625 1946195068359375
Theorem 1.17. Exponentiation by repeated squaring takes O(m2(lgm)(lg a)2) time.
Proof. The final result will have O((lg am) − 1) = O(m lg a) binary digits. For simplicity, all
intermediary results will be said to have O(m lg a) bits (which is still true).
O(lgm) iterations will be performed. In each iteration, a squaring (multiplication) and
maybe another multiplication will be performed, each in O((m lg a)2) time. So the total time
required will be O(lgm)O((m lg a)2) = O(m2(lgm)(lg a)2).
1.6.3 Time estimates for modular arithmetic
For any arithmetic done in a Zl ring, it will be assumed that most operands are almost as big as
l, after all, less than 1% of the elements of Zl will have fewer than log l−2 digits. Therefore each
addition and subtraction will be said to occur in O(lg l) time and each multiplication, division
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and mod will be said to occur in O((lg l)2) time. However, these time estimates do not consider
the reduction of the result (mod l).
Addition, Subtraction and Multiplication
Theorem 1.18. In the ring Zl, addition and subtraction each take O(lg l) time and multiplica-
tion takes O((lg l)2) time.
Proof. The time estimates for addition and subtraction in Zl do not change because of the
special nature of the modular reduction that is able to be employed.
After adding two numbers each less than l, the result must be less than 2l. So after the
O(lg l) addition, if the sum is greater than l, subtract l; no division is required, just two O(lg l)
operations. So addition requires 2O(lg l) = O(lg l) time.
Similarly, the result of a subtraction must be in the range [−l+ 1, l− 1]. If it is less than 0,
add l. Subtraction also takes O(lg l) time.
Multiplication is similar in that after an O((lg l)2) multiplication operation, an O((lg l)2)
mod operation follows and 2O((lg l)2) = O((lg l)2).
Exponentiation
Theorem 1.19. In the ring Zl, exponentiation, the evaluation of am, requires O((lgm)(lg l)2)
time.
Proof. All results will have O(lg l) bits. There will be O(lgm) iterations each with up to two
modular multiplications inO((lg l)2) time. Therefore the exponentiation will requireO((lgm)(lg l)2)
time.
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Division
Division is not defined in Zl but multiplication by an inverse (if it exists) can be performed after
it is found. If φ(l) is known, then a−1 = aφ(l)−1. φ(l) < l and thus φ(l) = O(l) as a quantity,
however knowing φ(l) is equivalent to knowing the prime factorization of a number (very hard
for very large l), and thus it may be practically unknowable.
Finding the inverse of a number, a, in Zl when φ(l) is not known can be done with the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm.2 After finding the greatest common divisor of a and l, which
will be 1 if an inverse exists, by the Euclidean Algorithm, run back up the sequence of steps
from the Euclidean Algorithm to express 1 as a linear combination of a and l, 1 = ra+ sl. Then
ar = (−s)l + 1 or ar ≡ 1 (mod l) and r = a−1 in Zl.
Theorem 1.20. The (Extended) Euclidean Algorithm takes O((lg l)3) time.3
Proof. This hinges on the speed of the decrease in the successive remainders from step to step.
Specifically, that if rj is the remainder from the jth step, then rj+2 < 12rj .
If rj+1 ≤ 12rj , then rj+2 < rj+1 ≤
1
2rj . If rj+1 >
1
2rj , then rj = 1 · rj+1 + rj+2 and
rj+2 = rj − rj+1 < 12rj because rj+1 >
1
2rj .
Since every two steps, the remainders are reduced by at least half, there will be no more than
2 lg l steps. Each step down requires one O((lg l)2) integer division, so the Euclidean Algorithm
requires O((lg l)3) time. Running back up the steps in the extension requires two O((lg l)2)
2For a complete description of the (Extended) Euclidean Algorithm see any elementary text on Number
Theory, including [7].
3The proof of this is essentially copied from Koblitz, 13. [4]
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multiplications at each of the O(lg l) steps. The extension also occurs in O((lg l)3) time, so the
entire Extended Euclidean Algorithm, and thus finding a−1 in Zl requires O((lg l)3) time.
Theorem 1.21. Multiplication in Zl by a−1 (assuming it exists) requires O((lg l)3) time (re-
gardless of the knowledge of φ(l).
Proof. The procedure entails first finding a−1, then multiplying by it in O((lg l)2) time.
If φ(l) is not known, finding a−1 by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm will take O((lg l)3)
time. If φ(l) is known, then finding a−1 = aφ(l)−1 will takeO(lg(φ(l)−1)(lg l)2) = O((lg l)(lg l)2) =
O((lg l)3) time
O((lg l)3) +O((lg l)2) = O((lg l)3)
1.7 Probability
1.7.1 Discrete distributions
Probability distributions are usually classified into two sets: discrete and continuous. Continuous
distributions describe situations where a continuum of outcomes are possible, such as an interval
of the Real numbers. Discrete distributions describe situations where the set of outcomes is
discrete, including all finite distributions.
Let S be the discrete set of all possible outcomes of an experiment. Let X represent the
outcome of a specific running of the experiment. X is called a random variable or a discrete
random variable. S is called the sample space of X. For each s ∈ S, X has a probability
of being s. Designate that probability p(s). p : S → R is called a probability distribution
function, or pdf .
15
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Definition 1.22 (random variable). A variable that will randomly assume values from a given
set.
Definition 1.23 (sample space). The set of all possible values of a random variable.
Definition 1.24 (probability distribution function). A function p : S → R from the sample
space of a random variable to the Real numbers such that for each s ∈ S, p(s) is the probability
that X = s. Probability distribution functions have the following properties:
• 0 ≤ p(s) ≤ 1 for each s ∈ S.
•
∑
s∈S p(s) = 1.
• For any subset A ⊆ S, p(A) =
∑
s∈A p(s).
• p(∅) = 0.
• For A,B ⊆ S, p(A ∪B) = p(A) + p(B)− p(A ∩B).
Verifying that a given p(x) is a valid probability distribution function requires p(s) ≥ 0 for
each s ∈ S and
∑
s∈S p(s) = 1.
For many discrete distributions, and all the ones used herein, the sample space S will be a
(not necessarily finite) set of consecutive integers. Whenever the sample space is a set of numbers
certain measurements of the probability distribution may be made. In fact, being numbers is
stricter than is necessary. In general, these measurements may be made whenever the sample
space S is a module of a ring containing the image of p.
16
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First will be the average, or arithmetic mean, value ofX. This is referred to as the expected
value of X. It is a weighted average of the sample space of X, weighted by each element’s
probability, commonly referred to as the mean.






Example 1.26. Find the expected value of X for the pdf given in Table 1.1.






First, verify that p is a valid pdf. By inspection, no p(x) is less than 0, and a quick addition
verifies that
∑3
x=0 p(x) = 1.




xp(x) = 0 · 12 + 1 ·
1
4 + 2 ·
1
8 + 3 ·
1









The expected value of X is 78 = 0.875.
Theorem 1.27. E[aX + b] = aE[X] + b.
17
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Proof. This follows straight from properties of summation.
























The expected value of a random variable is a measure of its central tendency, where X will
stay around. What it does not measure is how close X will stay. Variance is a measure of the
spread of X, how far it usually is from it’s expected value. It is almost a weighted average of
X’s distance from its mean.





(x− E[X])2p(x) = E[(X − E[X])2]
It is usually more convenient to calculate variance by a different formula.
Theorem 1.29. Var(X) = E[X2]− E[X]2.
18
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Proof.
Var(X) =E[(X − E[X])2]
=E[X2 − 2XE[X] + E[X]2]
=E[X2]− 2E[XE[X]] + E[E[X]2] Theorem 1.27
=E[X2]− 2E[X]E[X] + E[X]2 E[X] is a constant, Theorem 1.27
=E[X2]− E[X]2
Example 1.30. Calculate the variance of the pdf in Table 1.1 on page 17 by the definition of
variance, and by the formula from Theorem 1.29.
Recall that E[X] = 78 . Using the definition of variance,
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=02 · 12 + 1
2 · 14 + 2
2 · 18 + 3















Using the formula from Theorem 1.29 for the variance took fewer steps utilizing easier
arithmetic than using the definition of variance directly.
While expected value and variance give meaningful measurements of a probability distri-
bution that provide one with an understanding of the location and spread of a probability
distribution, they do not necessarily give a precise understanding of the shape of the distribu-
tion neither do they define the distribution. The reader may verify that the two distributions
of Table 1.2 each have a mean of 0 and a variance of 2.
1.7.2 The uniform distribution
If S is a finite sample space, then a uniform distribution is one where each s has the same
likelihood.
Definition 1.31 (uniform distribution). A distribution whose pdf p(s) = c, some fixed constant,
for every s ∈ S.
20
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Since the sum of all probabilities in a distribution must be 1, it is clear that in the uniform
distribution the constant probability, c, must be 1|S| . The standard primitive uniform distribution
covers the integers 0 to n, where p(x) = 1n+1 for each x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Any other discrete
uniform distribution on a finite set of consecutive integers is just a shift of this one.
Theorem 1.32. If X is a discrete random variable with a uniform distribution on the integers
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1.7.3 The geometric distribution
The geometric distribution models the situation where an experiment is tried repeatedly
until success is achieved. Each trial is considered independent of the others. The probability
of success each time is denoted by p and the probability of failure, 1 − p, is denoted by q.
The random variable, X, represented by the geometric distribution tells on which attempt the
first success occurs. X can take on any positive integer value. The geometric distribution,
while discrete, is not finite. The probability distribution function of a geometric distribution is
p(x) = pqx−1 for all positive integers, x, and 0 for any other value. The experiment must fail
with probability q for the first x− 1 trials then succeed on the xth trial with probability p.
Theorem 1.33. p(x) = pqx−1 is a valid probability distribution function when 0 < p < 1,
q = 1− p, and x takes only positive integer values.
Proof. Clearly p(x) is never negative, as both p and q are positive and x is a positive integer.
22
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It remains to verify that
∑∞


















= p1− (1− p) = 1.
If one is rolling a fair die for a 6, one might expect the first 6 to have an average appearance
on the third roll (half of the six possibilities). It would average on the third or fourth roll if
numbers couldn’t be re-rolled. Because trials can fail with the same outcome multiple times
without affecting future trials, the average first appearance of the 6 (or any other desired side
of the die) will be on the sixth roll. Likewise the average first head (or tail) on a fair coin will
happen on the second flip. In general, if the probability of success is p, then the first success





trial, as demonstrated below.
Theorem 1.34. If X is a random variable with a geometric distribution, then E[X] = 1p and



























































(i+ 1)2qi = p
∞∑
i=0



































= q + 1
p2













Example 1.35. An experiment consists of rolling a fair, six-sided die until a one is rolled. What
are the expected value and variance of the number of rolls it takes?
With six sides on the die and each side being equally likely, p = 16 and q =
5
6 . So the








Affine character cyphers are the oldest and most simple. These act on one character at a time
with the elementary operations of addition and multiplication.
Permutation cyphers, where each encyphering transformation is merely an element of the
symmetric group on a set X (to be defined later) could be considered. Using a cryptosystem
based on a general permutation cypher would require the storage and use of a complete cypher
table, whereas affine cyphers can be defined with only a few parameter values. The tradeoff
for this is that only a fraction of the permutations are able to be modeled by these simple
operations.
25
2.1. SHIFT CYPHERS CHAPTER 2. AFFINE CHARACTER CYPHERS
2.1 Shift Cyphers
One of the earliest recorded users of encyphered messages is Julius Caesar.1 The Caesar Cypher
is a simple one, where the transformation from plaintext to cyphertext merely involves replacing
each character with the one three positions further in the alphabet. See Table 2.1 for the
transformation.
Table 2.1: Caesar Cypher transformation.
pi A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
f(pi) D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
Before encyphering, plaintext is stripped of spaces and punctuation, and the characters are
arranged in blocks of five. Each character is then transformed according to Table 2.1 to generate
the cyphertext.
Example 2.1. Suppose, now, it is desired to encypher the message
I will cross the Rubicon next week,
with the Caesar Cypher. Arranging the letters in blocks of five and ignoring capitalization
results in
IWILL CROSS THERU BICON NEXTW EEK.
1Rosen, 189. [7]
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Looking up each letter in Table 2.1, each plaintext letter can be converted into it’s corresponding
cyphertext letter. For example, f(A) = D, f(J) = M and f(Q) = T. The corresponding
cyphertext is
LZLOO FURVV WKHUX ELFRQ QHAWZ HHN.
Decyphering is accomplished by applying the inverse transformation first, and then reinter-
preting the spacing and punctuation.
LZLOO FURVV WKHUX ELFRQ QHAWZ HHN
↓ f−1
IWILL CROSS THERU BICON NEXTW EEK
↓ interpret
I will cross the Rubicon next week.
The blocking of the letters into clusters of a fixed length has twofold purpose. First, an
adversary attempting to break the cypher could use the information from the original spacing
to his advantage. Second, for ease of reading, since a long, unbroken string of characters can be
difficult to read. The blocking into clusters isn’t used when the space is in the alphabet, but
then its associated cyphertext character will not likely be itself. The reasons for using all capital
letters is also twofold. First, ancient Latin didn’t have lowercase letters (though it didn’t have
the letter ’J’ either). Secondly, a 26-letter alphabet was chosen for this example.
Definition 2.2 (alphabet). A set, X, of characters used to build the plaintext and/or cypher-
text.
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While ‘A’ and ‘a’ are usually considered as the same letter, they are two distinct characters.
The alphabet used in this past example had 26 characters, ‘A’ through ‘Z’ in the usual order,
and no others. This required the plaintext and cyphertext to be spelled with only capital letters.
It shall become evident why the use of a 52-character alphabet with uppercase and lowercase
letters could give an adversary extra information to use to break this cypher, especially on a
message with multiple sentences. The 26 characters occurring most often would likely be the
lowercase letters, and the other 26 the uppercase letters.
The Caesar Cypher is an example of a shift cypher whose shift parameter is 3. Any shift
parameter could be used (though a shift of 0 would be neither interesting nor effective). Any
message using this 26-character alphabet has only 26 possible shift cyphers.
Definition 2.3 (shift cypher). A cypher scheme where each character of the plaintext is replaced
be the character a specified distance away in the alphabet to generate the cyphertext.
This definition of a shift cypher can be brought into an algebraic context. First, we use a
bijection to associate each character of the l-character alphabet with an element of Zl. Table 2.2
shows a standard assignment for the 26-character alphabet used in the previous example.
Table 2.2: 26-character alphabet.
X A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Z26 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
With this bijection in mind, each character of the alphabet, X, can be thought of as equiva-
lent to its associated element of Z26. In other words, the ring structure of Z26 can be copied onto
28
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X. It can now be said, for example, that D = A + 3, and so the encyphering transformation,
f , can be defined with an algebraic expression, namely f(p) = p+ 3 for the Caesar Cypher. A
more algebraic definition of shift cypher may now be given.
Definition 2.4 (shift cypher). A shift cypher on an alphabet represented by an additive
group G is one whose encyphering transformation, f : G→ G, is of the form f(p) = p+b, where
b ∈ G.
Example 2.5. Encypher the message “Meet me at the drop spot at noon,” using the standard
26-character alphabet and a shift cypher with b = 10.
Write the characters in the chosen alphabet and in blocks of a fixed length (five).
MEETM EATTH EDROP SPOTA TNOON
Apply the encyphering transformation f(p) = p+ 10 to each character.
WOODW OKDDR ONBYZ CZYDK DXYYX
Decyphering cyphertext into plaintext requires the use of f−1. For a shift cypher, clearly
f−1(c) = c−b. Anyone knowing what b was used to encypher a message will be able to decypher
it. This b is the key of the shift cypher.
Definition 2.6 (key). The value(s) of the parameter(s) of a given encryption scheme used for
a specific encyphering.
Any cryptosystem where inverse keys are easy to compute from each other is called a clas-
sical or symmetric. Cryptosystems where inverse keys are not easy to compute from each
other are discussed in Chapter 4.
29
2.2. LINEAR CYPHERS CHAPTER 2. AFFINE CHARACTER CYPHERS
Definition 2.7 (Symmetric cryptosystem). A cryptographic system where knowledge of the
encyphering key and the decyphering key are equivalent or computationally “easy.”
Example 2.8. Knowing that “WOODW OKDDR ONBYZ CZYDK DXYYX” was encyphered
in the standard 26-character alphabet with a shift cypher and a key of 10, decypher it to recover
the original message.
Apply the decyphering transformation f−1(c) = c− 10 to each character.
MEETM EATTH EDROP SPOTA TNOON
Spacing and punctuation may now be interpreted.
Meet me at the drop spot at noon.
2.2 Linear Cyphers
Rings, such as Zl, have two operations. In the shift cypher, addition is used. In the linear
cypher, multiplication is used. The encyphering transformation of a linear cypher is of the form
f(p) = ap. Remembering that f must be an invertible transformation, so that any cyphertext
generated by it may be uniquely decyphered, a must have a multiplicative inverse, so that
f−1(c) = a−1c can decypher cyphertext.
Definition 2.9 (linear cypher). A linear cypher on an alphabet represented by the ring R is
one whose encyphering transformation, f : R→ R, is of the form f(p) = ap, where a ∈ R∗.
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Example 2.10. Encypher the following plaintext with a linear cypher. Use a 30-character
alphabet where A-Z are represented by 0-25 as before, (space)=26, ‘,’=27, ‘.’=28, and ‘?’=29.
Use the encyphering key a = 7.
The eagle lands at dawn. Will you be ready?
Since the space is a member of the alphabet, the letters should not be rearranged. Addi-
tionally, note that two spaces follow the period between the sentences. Write the plaintext in
the alphabet to be used.
THE EAGLE LANDS AT DAWN. WILL YOU BE READY?
Convert the plaintext to elements of Z30.
(19, 7, 4, 26, 4, 0, 6, 11, 4, 26, 11, 0, 13, 3, 18, 26, 0, 19, 26, 3, 0, 22, 13,
28, 26, 26, 22, 8, 11, 11, 26, 24, 14, 20, 26, 1, 4, 26, 17, 4, 0, 3, 24, 29)
Apply the encyphering transformation f(p) = 7p.
(13, 19, 28, 2, 28, 0, 12, 17, 28, 2, 17, 0, 1, 21, 6, 2, 0, 13, 2, 21, 0, 4,
1, 16, 2, 2, 4, 26, 17, 17, 2, 18, 8, 20, 2, 7, 28, 2, 29, 28, 0, 21, 18, 23)
Convert the elements of Z30 into the cyphertext.
NT.C.AMR.CRABVGCANCVADBQCCD RRCSIUCH.C?.AVSX
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2.3 Affine Cyphers
The affine cypher combines the linear and shift cyphers, into a transformation of the form
f(p) = ap + b. Or, rather, the shift and linear cyphers are special cases of the affine cypher
where a = 1 and b = 0 respectively. The key of an affine cypher is an ordered pair, (a, b).
Theorem 2.11. The composition of two affine cyphers is an affine cypher.2
Proof.
f2(f1(p)) =f2(a1p+ b1)
=a2(a1p+ b1) + b2
=(a2a1)p+ (a2b1 + b2)
Just as shift and linear cyphers are special cases of the affine cypher, as special cases of
Theorem 2.11 the composition of two shift cyphers is a shift cypher (where a2 = a1 = 1) and
the composition of two linear cyphers is a linear cypher (where b2 = b1 = 0).
2.4 Abstractions
2.4.1 Ring Choices
All of the examples so far, and most of the considerations, have been using a cyclic ring of
integers (mod l), Zl, as the algebraic representation of the alphabet set, X. However, any ring
2Further analysis of the algebraic structure of affine cyphers will be developed in section 2.4.
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of the same size as X will do. In addition to modular rings of integers, finite polynomial rings
may be used. Table 2.3 illustrates a finite polynomial ring representing a 32-character alphabet.
This ring has 15 units, which are indicated in the third column. A finite polynomial field would
have a larger group of units.
Being a unit in a ring is equivalent to not being a multiple of any irreducible zero divisors.
The irreducible zero divisors of the ring in Table 2.3 are t − 1 and t4 + t3 + t2 + t + 1. Since
the ring only has five dimensions, being a multiple of t4 + t3 + t2 + t + 1 would mean being
t4 + t3 + t2 + t+ 1. Being a multiple of t− 1 means 1 is a zero of the polynomial, which would
mean having an even number of terms. So the units in Table 2.3 are all the polynomials with
an odd number of terms other than t4 + t3 + t2 + t+ 1.
2.4.2 Group of keys
Once an appropriate ring, R, is chosen to represent the alphabet being used, X, the set of
all possible affine character cyphers, f(p) = ap + b, is determined. b can be any element
of R, and a can be any element of R∗. Each unique cypher can be represented by its key,
(a, b). Let K represent the set of all affine character cypher keys for a particular ring, R, thus
K = {(a, b) : a ∈ R∗, b ∈ R}. Theorem 2.11 established that the composition of affine character
cyphers in a ring is closed. This structure may be imposed onto K as a binary operation.
Theorem 2.12. K is a group under this imposed binary operation and the product of two keys
is the key of the composition cypher.
Proof. Using the result from Theorem 2.11, if k1 = (a1, b1) and k2 = (a2, b2), then the result
of encyphering with k1 first, followed by k2, is equivalent to a single encyphering with the key
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Table 2.3: 32-character alphabet represented by the polynomial ring F2[t]〈t5−1〉




D t+ 1 No
E t2 Yes
F t2 + 1 No
G t2 + t No
H t2 + t+ 1 Yes
I t3 Yes
J t3 + 1 No
K t3 + t No
L t3 + t+ 1 Yes
M t3 + t2 No
N t3 + t2 + 1 Yes
O t3 + t2 + t Yes
P t3 + t2 + t+ 1 No
Q t4 Yes
R t4 + 1 No
S t4 + t No
T t4 + t+ 1 Yes
U t4 + t2 No
V t4 + t2 + 1 Yes
W t4 + t2 + t Yes
X t4 + t2 + t+ 1 No
Y t4 + t3 No
Z t4 + t3 + 1 Yes
(space) t4 + t3 + t Yes
, t4 + t3 + t+ 1 No
. t4 + t3 + t2 Yes
? t4 + t3 + t2 + 1 No
’ t4 + t3 + t2 + t No
: t4 + t3 + t2 + t+ 1 No
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(a2a1, a2b1 + b2). Let this result be the definition of k2k1. Since a2a1 ∈ R∗ and a2b1 + b2 ∈ R,
then k = k2k1 ∈ K. The identity is (1, 0):
(1, 0)(a, b) = (1a, 1b+ 0) = (a, b) = (a · 1, a · 0 + b) = (a, b)(1, 0).
The inverse of (a, b) is (a−1,−a−1b):
(a, b)(a−1,−a−1b) = (aa−1, a(−a−1b) + b) = (1, 0) = (a−1a, a−1b− a−1b) = (a−1,−a−1b)(a, b).
Thus K has a group structure mimicking the group of encyphering and decyphering transfor-
mations themselves.











 a2a1 a2b1 + b2
0 1

With the formula for the determinant of a 2 × 2 matrix, it is clear that valid keys require an
invertible a, and the value of b is irrelevant to invertibility.
When considering the character cypher transformations, shift and linear cyphers were con-
sidered special cases of the affine cypher. Therefore, the sets of keys yielding shift and linear
cyphers are subsets of this group K. Let the set of all shift cypher keys in K be denoted by
S = {(1, b) ∈ K}, and the linear cypher keys in K by L = {(a, 0) ∈ K}. Clearly S,L ⊆ K, but
it can also be easily verified that S,L ≤ K. Furthermore S E K
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Theorem 2.13. The group of shift cyphers is a normal subgroup of the group of affine cyphers.
Proof. Clearly the identity is in S, and the inverse of a shift is another shift. Closure may
easily verified by the reader. For normality, using the inverse and composition formulas stated
in Theorem 2.12,
(a, b)−1(1, b0)(a, b) = (a−1,−a−1b)(a, b+ b0) = (1, a−1b0) ∈ S.
Therefore S E K.
S is an Abelian group by the commutativity of addition in R, and L will also be Abelian
if multiplication in R is commutative, but K is not Abelian. As sets, K ∼= L × S, but not
as groups. Each (a, 0) ∈ L can represent an element of Aut(S), specifically, left multiplication
of b by a in R. As groups, K ∼= S n L. Although, in this sense, one might want to list the
components of an element of K in the reverse order: (b, a) instead of (a, b). Written that way,
the definition of multiplication in K looks exactly like a semi-direct product.
(b2, a2)(b1, a1) = (b2 + a2b1, a2a1)
At this point, encyphering and decyphering can be phrased in terms of group actions of
keys, K, on an alphabet, X. Encyphering and decyphering are actions of inverse keys. The only
distinction, at this point, is one of order. Given a key, k, and its inverse, k−1. If one applies k
first, then k−1 to a character of plaintext, x: k−1 · (k · x), then k is called the encryption key
and k−1 is called the decryption key. If they are used in the other order, then k−1 is called the
encryption key and k the decryption key.
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2.4.3 Text Vectors And Sequences
For a given alphabet, X, a message (whether plaintext or cyphertext) is a finite sequence of
elements of X; (xi)ni=1 for some n ∈ N. The message could also be considered a finite-length
vector over X, [xi]ni=1 ∈ Xn. Vector notation is more compact, and so will be preferred, though
sequence nomenclature and verbiage is more natural to the situation.
Definition 2.14 (message). Given an alphabet set, X, a message written in X is a finite length
vector element of Xn. The message may also be equated with the same length sequence of the
same alphabet characters in the same order:
[xi]ni=1 ∼= (xi)ni=1.
Each message is an element of Xn. Xn is the set of all messages of length n. With the
structure of a ring, R, imposed through a bijection ontoX, thenXn is also a set of n-dimensional
vectors. The set of all messages, P and/or C, is the infinite union ∪∞n=1Xn.
Earlier, encyphering was described as a group action on the alphabet, X. With that group
action already defined, then the action of encyphering on a vector of characters, x ∈ Xn, can be
described as distributing the group action to each entry in the vector, just like multiplication by
a scalar in R. Encyphering is now a group action of the keyspace, K, on the message space, P.
However, because the only difference between the encyphering group action on a vector and on
a character is a repetition of the encyphering function n times, the base action on the character
is all that needs to be analyzed.
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2.5 Breaking and Time Analyses
The number of shift cyphers is equal to the number of possible shifts (b), the number of elements
of R. A b of zero is neither interesting nor effective, but |R| − 1 is still O(|R|). So the size of
the keyspace of a shift cypher is O(|R|).
The number of linear cyphers is equal to the number of elements in R∗. When R = Zl, then
this is equal to φ(l), the Euler Totient (or Phi) Function.3 The actual value of φ(l) depends
greatly on the prime factorization of l. The more distinct prime factors l has, the smaller φ(l)
will be. However, if l is prime then φ(l) = l−1 and if l is the product of two distinct primes, then
φ(l) is still respectably big. Since time estimates should cover "worst case" scenarios, and it is
desirable in cryptographic settings to use rings with large groups of units, and the ring to work
in may be freely chosen, it can be said that l = O(φ(l)) and φ(l) = O(l). As a generalization, it
shall be considered that |R| = O(|R∗|). So the size of the keyspace of a linear cypher is O(|R|).
The keyspace of an affine cypher is the semi-direct product of the keyspaces of the shift and
linear cyphers. Its size is equal to the product of the two constituents’ sizes. So the size of the
keyspace of an affine cypher is O(|R|2).
To use an affine cypher (or either of its special cases), an element of the keyspace must
be chosen at random then up to one multiplication and one addition are performed on each
character. Choosing the key is a constant-time activity: some fixed number of random numbers
in a fixed range are chosen. Performing the multiplication and addition require times that are
dependent upon the ring being used. In the case of Zl, then the time estimates from Section 1.6.3
3The Euler Phi Function and it’s properties should be adequately described in any introductory number
theory text.
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may be used. Thus, for any particular message with a fixed size, the running time to encypher it
with an affine cypher is O((lg l)2 + lg l) = O((lg l)2). The running time naturally grows linearly
with respect to the message length, but since all operations discussed here will be linear with
respect to message length, that aspect may be ignored from all analyses.
2.5.1 Cypher Attacks
There are many different types of sophisticated analyses that can be performed on a cypher.
This section will give a brief synopsis of three simple methods of attacking a cypher. The brute
force attack is the simplest, just keep guessing keys and trying them until the correct one is
found. It neither requires nor uses any information beyond knowledge of what cryptosystem was
used. When analyzing a cryptosystem, it is always presumed that an attacker knows everything
about the cryptosystem and its keyspace, just not which key was used. Academically, a break
of a cryptosystem is deemed whenever a vulnerability is found that allows a key to be identified
faster than brute force, even if employing such a break is practically infeasible.
Brute Force Attack
The brute force attack is the least sophisticated and most time consuming. Armed with no
additional knowledge than the cryptosystem used and its affiliated keyspace, an attacker tries
all keys until the correct one is found. This will eventually work, presuming that intelligible
plaintext can be easily identified (such as actual linguistic text or a known binary file’s header
format).
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Theorem 2.15. The expected time to execute a brute force attack on a cypher will be linear
with respect to the size of the keyspace.
Proof. If the key used to generate a given cyphertext was chosen randomly and fairly, then each
key had an equal chance of being chosen. Thus the probability of being the correct key is a
uniform distribution over the keyspace, K, where each key has a probability of p = 1|K| of being
correct.
If an attacker is able to order the entire keyspace in any arrangement and systematically
iterate across the list of keys, then each guess also has an equal likelihood: the first key tried,
the third key in the sequence and the last key all have a probability of p of being correct.
The probability of the attacker finding the key in n tries is exactly the probability that the
nth key is correct. Thus the number of guesses required will also be a uniform distribution on
the set {1, 2, . . . |K|}. The average number of tries will be the mean of a uniform distribution,
|K|+1
2 = O|K|.
If an attacker is not able to order the entire keyspace (if, perhaps, it is too large to fit in his
computer’s memory and/or storage and too complex to define a systematic method of iteration)
then the attacker must guess randomly. Without being able to remember which keys had already
been guessed, then it becomes possible for the same key to be guessed multiple times. On each
guess, the attacker will have a probability of p of guessing correctly. The number of guesses
required to find the key now follows a geometric distribution. The average number of guesses
required will be the mean of a geometric distribution, 1p = |K| = O(|K|).
And, therefore, the number of guesses required is O(|K|). Each guess will require applying a
decyphering. The time complexity of the decyphering is dependent upon the cryptosystem and
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representative ring used. For an affine cypher, each guess will require O((one multiplication) +
(one addition)) time. While the choice of ring can affect both the size of the keyspace and the
complexity of the cypher transformations (i.e. Z29 will cause a larger keyspace and slightly
longer operations than Z27), if the complexity of the (en-/de-)cyphering could be held constant
while changing the size of the keyspace, the time for a brute force attack would grow linearly.
Example 2.16. The time required for a brute force attack on an affine cypher using Zl is
equal to the product of the number of guesses, O(l2), and the time to decypher with each guess,
O((lg l)2), thus O(l2(lg l)2).
Known Plaintext Attack
If the plaintext for a specific piece of cyphertext is known, then the key could be solved for
algebraically. Set up the equation c = f(p) and solve for the parameters of f . This is called
a known plaintext attack. In practice, the knowledge of the plaintext could come from
knowledge of a standard signature used by the sender of a text message or by the known header
format of a binary file (ZIP, JPEG, MP3, DOC, . . . ) or other covert means.
For a shift cypher (f(p) = p+ b) or a linear cypher (f(p) = ap) only one plaintext/cypher-
text pair of characters is required to find the key. For an affine cypher (f(p) = ap + b) two
plaintext/cyphertext pairs of characters are required to solve for the key, but having just one
will still cut down the number of possible keys in a brute force attack to O(
√
|K|).
Example 2.17. Suppose that in the cyphertext
KIYYO TKOQG FUBGF WITVI YVWTS
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generated with an affine cypher in the standard 26-letter alphabet from Table 2.2 it is known
that O represents E and that W represents I.
This gives the following system of equations.
14 =4a+ b
22 =8a+ b
Linear systems of equations in rings can be solved the same way as elementary systems
in R: with either substitution or elimination/addition, however, if the ring being worked in is
not a field, there may be no solution or multiple ones even if the system is otherwise linearly
independent. For a known plaintext attack, it is guaranteed that a key exists to map the
plaintext letters to the cyphertext letters, but the linear system in the ring may still not have
one unique solution.
Subtracting the two equations in Z26 gives 4a = 8, which is equivalent to 2a = 4 or 17.
17 is not a double in Z26, but 4 is, so a = 2 or 15. Substituting either value for a, or more
simply substituting 8 for 4a gives b = 6. This system has two solutions: (2, 6) and (15, 6). To
be a proper key, the a must be invertible. 2 is not invertible in Z26, so the key must have been
(15, 6). The inverse key is (7, 10) and when it is applied to the cyphertext plain English results,
COMMENCE SATURATION BOMBING.
If only one pair of letters were known, say that O was the image of E, then for each possible
a (only the units), only one b was possible and could be solved for. That would reduce the brute
force attack from 13∗25 = 325 possibilities to only 13, but with the extra effort required in each
try of solving for b (one modular subtraction).
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Frequency Analysis
If no piece of plaintext is actually known, it could still be possible to guess some plaintext. An
analysis of the cyphertext could imply some good guesses.
For example, the cyphertext of Example 2.17 has a double Y near the beginning. Few
English letters are doubled often, so it would make sense to guess that the doubled letter was
one of those, such as E, S or T.
An analysis of the distribution of characters in the cyphertext, and a comparison of that
distribution with the already known distribution of characters in plaintext is a very common
technique. This type of attack is called a frequency analysis. Spoken languages are not
written with a uniform distribution of characters from their alphabets. In English, for example,
E and T are the most common characters and Z, X and Q are the least common. A comparison
of the cyphertext character distribution with a known character distribution of the plaintext
language will also imply some good guesses.
The character distribution of the cyphertext from Example 2.8 is given in Table 2.4. The
most commonly occurring character in the cyphertext is D. The most commonly occurring letter
in English is E. It could be guessed that the encyphering key was -1. Decyphering with a key
of -1 gives the following:
XPPEX PLEES POCZA DAZEL EYZZY.
Apparently -1 was not the key. Looking at the distribution again, if the key were -1 then the
plaintext would have had to have a surprisingly large number of X’s, Y’s, and Z’s. The second
most popular letter in English is T. It could be guessed that the encyphering key was 10, and
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this second guess is correct.
Table 2.4: Character distribution of cyphertext in Example 2.8.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
0 1 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 2
Example 2.18. Suppose it is known that the cyphertext
JKXMK ZFKJJ KXMJB SJGEJ BMUOM EJGKF
was generated by an affine cypher on the standard 26-letter alphabet. A statistical analysis
on a larger portion of cyphertext revealed that ’M’ and ’J’ are the two most common letters.
Knowing that the most popular letters in English plaintext are ’E’ and ’T’, find the encryption
key and decrypt the previous snippet.
Assuming that f(E = 4) = M = 12 and f(T = 19) = J = 9 the following system of equations
(in Z26) comes out 
12 = a · 4 + b
9 = a · 19 + b
.
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So the encryption key was (5, 18). The decyphering transformation is f−1(c) = a−1(c − b) =
a−1c − a−1b. So the decryption key is (21, 14). Applying the decyphering transformation of
f−1(c) = 21c+ 14 to the above cyphertext results in
TOBEO RNOTT OBETH ATIST HEQUE STION,
or rather
To be, or not to be, that is the question.
2.5.2 Composition of encypherings
Theorem 2.11 established that the composition of encypherings is closed. This is considered a
weakness in a cryptosystem. One might think that encyphering a piece of plaintext twice would
square, or at least double, the difficulty in breaking it, but when the set of keys form a group,
no matter how many times a plaintext is encyphered with how many different keys, it is still
no more difficult to break than if it was encyphered once with the single key of the encyphering
composition.
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The closure of affine encypherings under composition is with the assumption that both
encypherings were performed in the same ring with the same bijection between the alphabet
set, X, and the ring, R. If |X1| = |R1| ≤ |R2| = |X2|, then one can generate injective maps
ι1 : X1 → R1, ι2 : R1 → R2, and ι3 : R2 → X2, and the composition ι3 ◦ f2 ◦ ι2 ◦ f1 ◦ ι1 will be
an encyphering from the alphabet X1 to the alphabet X2. This will be fully invertible as it is
the composition of injective functions.
Example 2.19. Encypher the following plaintext using the 32-letter alphabet described in
Table 2.5 with two affine character transformations. Do the first encyphering in Z32 with a key
of (5, 12), and the second in F2[t]〈t5−1〉 with a key of (t3 + t2 + 1, t2 + 1).
To be, or not to be: that is the question:
Whether ’tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them?4
The plaintext should first be written in the chosen alphabet (all capital letters and ignore
line breaks).
TO BE, OR NOT TO BE: THAT IS THE QUESTION: WHETHER ’TIS NOBLER IN THE MIND TO
SUFFER THE SLINGS AND ARROWS OF OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE, OR TO TAKE ARMS AGAINST A
SEA OF TROUBLES, AND BY OPPOSING END THEM?
Next, the intermediary cyphertext is computed with the first key.
4Shakespeare, William. Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, III.1
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If the result of a first affine encyphering is injected into a different ring of equal or greater size,
then put through a second affine encyphering, this composition will be harder to break. Assume
that the pre-images of two cyphertext characters is already known, whether by knowledge of the
form of the plaintext or a statistical analysis. What is not known is the intermediary cyphertext
characters (the image of the two known plaintext letters through only the first encyphering
transformation). For each of the possible O(l12) encryption keys for the first encyphering, there
is up to one valid second encryption key of the O(l22) total that will map the two intermediary
cyphertext characters to the correct two final cyphertext characters. And this will require a
brute force check: for each possible decryption key for the second transformation, calculate the
images of the two known cyphertext characters, solve the 2x2 system to find the decryption key
for the first transformation (if it exists), apply the two decyphering transformations and see if
5This line break was inserted for legibility, while the previous two occurred naturally at single spaces in the
cyphertext.
6Both of these line breaks were inserted for legibility, as the final cyphertext has no spaces in it.
47
2.5. BREAKING AND TIME ANALYSESCHAPTER 2. AFFINE CHARACTER CYPHERS





D 3 t+ 1
E 4 t2
F 5 t2 + 1
G 6 t2 + t
H 7 t2 + t+ 1
I 8 t3
J 9 t3 + 1
K 10 t3 + t
L 11 t3 + t+ 1
M 12 t3 + t2
N 13 t3 + t2 + 1
O 14 t3 + t2 + t
P 15 t3 + t2 + t+ 1
Q 16 t4
R 17 t4 + 1
S 18 t4 + t
T 19 t4 + t+ 1
U 20 t4 + t2
V 21 t4 + t2 + 1
W 22 t4 + t2 + t
X 23 t4 + t2 + t+ 1
Y 24 t4 + t3
Z 25 t4 + t3 + 1
(space) 26 t4 + t3 + t
, 27 t4 + t3 + t+ 1
. 28 t4 + t3 + t2
? 29 t4 + t3 + t2 + 1
’ 30 t4 + t3 + t2 + t
: 31 t4 + t3 + t2 + t+ 1
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legible plaintext results. This requires the same O(l2(lg l)2) as the dumb (knowledgeless) brute
force attack described in Section 2.5.1.
Example 2.20. The two most common alphabet characters in the plaintext in Example 2.19
are (space) occurring 38 times and T occurring 19 times. O occurs 18 times and E occurs 17
times. Assume that an attacker already knows two plaintext characters, say that (space) is
represented by B and that T is represented by Z in the cyphertext. What the attacker does
not know is the intermediary cyphertext characters B and L for (space) and T respectively. If
those were known, then all that would need to be done is solve two 2× 2 systems, one in each
ring. However, without knowing those two characters, he must consider every possible pair of
intermediary characters. For example, there are 32*15=480 possible keys in the polynomial ring
and 512 possible keys in the cyclic ring. For each of the 480 keys, an attacker may calculate the
pre-image, intermediary, cyphertext characters of B and Z, then solve the system in the cyclic
ring to find the key (if it exists) that would send (space) and T to them. On average, this will
take 240 tries, based on Theorem 2.15.
2.5.3 Distribution Count Variance
The United States’ Declaration of Independence is reproduced in Appendix A. This is a decently
sized document free of copyright. It will be a running example throughout this work. Each time it
will be considered to be in a 128-letter alphabet, encoded by the standard 7-bit ASCII standard
for the computer representation of text characters. Each uppercase letter, lowercase letter,
decimal digit, punctuation mark, and other control character (such as tabs and new lines) have a
standard numerical assignment. There are actually a number of standard character assignments
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for alphabets in different languages (ANSI, ASCII, the ISO family, the Unicode family, etc.. . . ),
most of the encodings of Latin alphabets (especially the English alphabet) agree with the ASCII
standard for most of the first 128 characters. This choice of alphabet is usually automatically
handled by the text software (word processor, web browser, email program, etc. . . . ) so in
application, all that really needs to be considered is bits or bytes. The 26- to 30-character
alphabets will continue to be used in small examples throughout this work for ease of human
comprehension.
The character distribution of the plaintext Declaration of Independence is shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. The Declaration of Independence was encyphered with an affine character cypher, the
result of which is also presented in Appendix A. Note the jumbling of the paragraph breaks,
as the Carriage Return and Line Feed (new paragraph) characters are considered alphabetic
elements. The character distribution of the affine cyphertext Declaration of Independence is
also shown in Figure 2.1 for comparison. Note that the net effect between the two distributions
is just a shuffling of the bars in the histogram. The characters in the cyphertext appear no more
random than in the plaintext, they are just different characters.
The statistical measures of expectation and variance can be used to measure how evenly
spread out the distribution of characters is in a plaintext or cyphertext. Actually, expectation
(average) will not indicate any of that, but it is used in the formula for variance. An average
of the counts of each character should come out as total characterssize of alphabet regardless of whether it is
the plaintext or the cyphertext, or of the encryption scheme used. The variance will give an
indication of how non-uniform the character distribution is. The variance is the average of the
squares of the distribution count minus the square of the average of the distribution count, per
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Figure 2.1: Character distributions of plaintext and an example affine cyphertext Declaration
of Independence.
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where c(a) is the count of the number of a’s in the plaintext or cyphertext.
A higher variance means that some characters are occurring more often than other char-
acters, a less uniform distribution of characters. A lower variance means that more characters
occur approximately the same number of times, a more uniform distribution of characters. The
more uniform the character distribution of a cyphertext is, the closer it appears to a random
sequence, and the harder it is to analyze for information.
Example 2.21. Find the variance of the cyphertext from Example 2.8. The character distri-
bution table is reproduced here.
First find the average of the character distribution.






Find the average of the squares of the distribution.


















The variance of the character distributions of both the plaintext and the cyphertext of affine
character transformations are the same. For the text of the Declaration of Independence, the
variance of both distributions shown in Figure 2.1 is approximately 31707.
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Table 2.6: Character distribution of cyphertext in Example 2.8 (reproduced).
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z




There are a number of mutually related disadvantages with the character cyphers described
in Chapter 2. First is the small number of possible encryption keys. Second is the ease of a
statistical analysis on the cyphertext to break it. This is because of the small alphabet, and that
every ’A’ in the plaintext gets mapped to the exact same cyphertext character. Both of these
weaknesses may be overcome by a simple alteration. Rather than encyphering one character at
a time, in a ring the size of the alphabet, blocks of m characters are associated together and
encyphering is done in a ring magnitudes larger than the size of the alphabet. Specifically, if
the alphabet has l characters, then the ring will have lm elements.
This modification drastically increases the number of possible encryption keys; the larger
rings will have a larger number of invertible elements for the multiplicative a component and a
larger number of total elements for the additive b component. This modification also diversifies
the image of each character, as encyphering happens block-by-block rather than character-by-
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character, thus increasing the statistical analysis required for breakage. What character any
specific ’A’ in the plaintext gets mapped to by the encyphering, will now depend on where in
the block the ’A’ occurs and the other characters in the block.
3.1 Multiple Digit m-graphs
Definition 3.1 (m-graph). A block of m letters in a plaintext or cyphertext. 2-graphs and
3-graphs are also called digraphs and trigraphs.
One simple way to inject a block of m characters of a size l alphabet into a cyclic ring, is by
considering that block as an m-digit number in base l. Each block of m letters will be mapped
to an element of the ring Zlm . Given a bijection from the alphabet to the ring, j : X → Zl, one




Affine transformations in Zlm happen just the same as ones in Zl, except there are now
more choices for the parameters a and b. There are lm possibilities for b and φ(lm) = lm−1φ(l)
possibilities for a. So the total number of possible keys is O(l2m). The number of possible
encryption keys grows exponentially with the size of the block.
Example 3.2. Encypher the message
RUBBER BABY BUGGY BUMPERS
using the standard 26-letter alphabet from above with a multidigit affine transformation on
digraphs using the encryption key (93, 521). Note that 262 = 676 and that our message has an
above average number of B’s. Character distribution tables for both the plaintext and cyphertext
appear at the end of the example.
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First write the code in blocks of two.
RU BB ER BA BY BU GG YB UM PE RS
Convert each digraph to an element of Z676 with the aid of Table 2.2.
17:20 1:1 4:17 1:0 1:24 1:20 6:6 24:1 20:12 15:4 17:18
462 27 121 26 50 46 162 625 532 394 460
Apply the encyphering transformation f(p) = 93p+ 512.
223 328 282 235 439 67 39 510 649 659 37
Convert back to digraphs in the 26-letter alphabet.
8:15 12:16 10:22 9:1 16:23 2:15 1:13 19:16 24:25 25:9 1:11
IP MQ KW JB QX CP BV TQ YZ ZJ BL
Arrange the cyphertext in blocks of five for easy human reading.
IPMQK WJBQX CPBNT QYZZJ BL
Table 3.1: Character distributions of Example 3.2.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
plaintext 1 6 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 0
cyphertext 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 2
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The character distributions for Example 3.2 are in Table 3.1. Example 3.2 started with
a plaintext containing 6 B’s. Those 6 B’s were mapped by the encyphering transformation
to 4 different letters: M, Q, J, and C, and the three B’s that are in the cyphertext came
from three different plaintext letters: A, G, and R. The letters in the cyphertext are more
spread out than in the plaintext. This is visible in the histogram of Figure 3.1. It can also be
demonstrated by finding the variance of the counts of the letters in each. Using the formula








































Figure 3.1: Character distributions of Example 3.2.
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That the third B in the plaintext went to a Q is a coincidence, but it is not a coincidence
that the second and sixth B’s went to the same letter. The least significant digit in an affine
transformation is not affected by the more significant digits, this is true even in base 10. The
ones digit of any multiplications and additions is only determined by the ones digits of the
components. Notice also that the first two U’s, each in the least significant digit of their
respective digraphs, each went to P.
The fact that the image of each letter in the least significant digit of each block is constant
with respect to the more significant digits is a weakness of this block cypher scheme. If the
alphabet and block size are known, which is standard, an attacker could gain information by
a statistical analysis of only the least significant digits of each block. With enough statistical
data, an attacker could determine the residue of the encryption key mod l.
For known plaintext attack, an attacker would need to know the plaintext equivalents of 2
blocks of cyphertext, just as he needed to know the plaintext equivalent of two characters of
cyphertext for an affine, character transformation. This could be more than m times harder,
because it requires two properly aligned, length-m blocks of contiguous characters to be known,
not just m times as many characters.
A statistical analysis can still be performed if enough cyphertext is available. Rather than
counting the number of each character, the number of each possible length-m block must be
counted and compared to a known m-graph distribution in the plaintext alphabet. Because the
data being counted are m times as big as with the character cyphers, and there are lm−1 times
as many possible data elements, it will now take at least mlm−1 times as much cyphertext to
be able to make as accurate of a statistical analysis as it did against single character cyphers.
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Affine transformations for a multidigit m-graph now require time on the order of O((lg lm)2)
because each arithmetic operation now happens on numbers the size of lm rather than l. The
number of arithmetic operations required for a block cypher, though, is now only 1m as many as
for a character cypher on a message of the same length. The time required to use a multi-digit
m-graph cypher is O( (lg l
m)2
m ) = O(m(lg l)2). With O(l2m) possible keys, a brute force attack
against a multi-digit, affine, m-graph cypher will take O(ml2m(lg l)2) time. This encryption










































































Affine Multidigit Digraph Cyphertext
Figure 3.2: Character distributions of plaintext and an example multidigit, digraph, affine
cyphertext Declaration of Independence
Once again, the Declaration of Independence was encyphered. This time with a multi-
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digit, digraph, affine transformation. The key used was (8567, 612). The text of the resulting
cyphertext is included in Appendix A. The character distribution histogram of the cyphertext
is graphed in Figure 3.2. The distribution of the original plaintext is included in the figure
for reference. Clearly, the cyphertext distribution shows a more even spread in the character
counts. This cyphertext has a character count variance of approximately 10100, as opposed
to the plaintext’s of approximately 31700. This smoother spread in the character distribution
indicates that a statistical analysis will require more than merely counting the characters to be
meaningful.
Notice that plaintext character 32 (space) has over 1300 occurrences, but no cyphertext
character has so many. This is because not every space in the plaintext was mapped to the same
character in the cyphertext. However, as previously mentioned, since the least significant digit
of the result of an arithmetic computation is only dependent on the least significant digits of
the operands, any space that occurred as the second character in a digraph was mapped to the
same character. Only character 68 (D) of the cyphertext has over 750 occurrences. Clearly, any
D in the cyphertext that occurs as the second character of a digraph is the image of a space in
the plaintext.
Rather than counting characters and guessing a pair of mappings based on known characters
in the plaintext alphabet, a statistical analysis on the cyphertext requires a count of the digraphs.
This count can then be compared to a list of known common digraphs in the plaintext alphabet
(such at ’th’, ’he’, and ’ng’ in English) to generate probable guesses for pair mappings to solve
for the key algebraically. The process is the same as for the single character cyphers, but
requires more data handling and computations. For this digraph example, a histogram of digraph
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frequencies could be generated for the two texts; this histogram would resemble Figure 2.1 in
the sense that the bars of the cyphertext histogram would look merely like rearrangements of
the bars of the plaintext histogram, except that there would now be 1282 = 16384 bars instead
of 128. A presentation of this histogram here would, therefore, be impractical.
3.2 Vector m-graphs
Rather than considering each component character of an m-graph as a digit, it could also be
considered as a vector component. Rather than a mapping into Zlm , a mapping into Zlm, or
any Rm, is used. However, the vectors of Rm do not form a ring, for they may only be added,
not multiplied. An affine transformation will require a matrix multiplication by an invertible
element of Mm(R). It will have the form
f(p) = Ap+ b,
where A ∈ Mm(R)∗ and b ∈ Rm. The benefit thereof, is that the image of every component of
each vector, p, will be determined by every other component of the vector (for a reasonably well
chosen value of A).
The multidigit m-graph method only lends itself well to rings of the form Zl, but finite-
length vectors and the matrices by which they may be multiplied can be naturally formed from
any ring. And the natural (left) multiplication of elements of Rm by elements of Mm(R) show
Rm to be a (left) Mm(R)-module.1
Example 3.3. Encypher the message
1See Grove, p125 [1], for a discussion of modules.
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RUBBER BABY BUGGY BUMPERS
using the standard 26-letter alphabet from above with a vector affine transformation on digraphs








First write the code in blocks of two.
RU BB ER BA BY BU GG YB UM PE RS









































































Convert back to digraphs in the 26-letter alphabet.
BH LY OH ZR BD FB IE CF SW LV DT
Arrange the cyphertext in blocks of five for easy human reading.
BHLYO HZRBD FBIEC FSWLV DT
After Example 3.2, a comparison was made between the variances of the character distribu-
tions of the plaintext and the cyphertext to demonstrate that block cyphers yield a cyphertext
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with a more spread out character distribution than single character cyphers. A character dis-
tribution count table for Example 3.3 is shown in Table 3.2. It was further demonstrated that
the multidigit block cyphers are not able to spread out the distribution of the characters in the
least significant positions of their respective blocks. Vector cyphers are able to spread out the
character distributions of all positions in the block. Therefore, the vector cyphers should tend
to produce cyphertext whose character distributions have an even lesser variance. To illustrate
this, a calculation of the variance in the character counts of the cyphertext from Example 3.3
results in a variance of about 0.669, less than that for either the plaintext or the multidigit
cyphertext.
Table 3.2: Character distributions of Example 3.3.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
plaintext 1 6 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 0
cyphertext 0 3 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
With |Mm(R)∗| = O(lm
2) (for an l-letter alphabet) choices for A and |Rm| = O(lm) choices
for b, there are O(lm2+m) possible encryption keys. Each affine transformation requires m2
multiplications in R. Each affine transformation will require O(m2(lg l)2) time and again only
1
m as many are required, so the total time to use a vector affine cypher is O(m(lg l)2), the same
as for the multidigit cypher. A brute-force attack will, therefore, require O(mlm2+m(lg l)2) time.
The Declaration of Independence was encyphered twice with vector block cyphers, once with
digraphs and once with 4-graphs. Both cyphertexts are included in Appendix A. The vector
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Affine Multidigit Digraph Cyphertext
Affine Vector digraph Cyphertext
Figure 3.3: Character distribution of example vector digraph cyphertext of the Declaration of
Independence
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and the vector 4-graph encyphering used the key

37 68 26 95
16 103 100 89
122 33 17 51











Figure 3.3 shows the resulting character distribution of the vector, digraph encyphering with
the distribution for the multidigit, digraph encyphering included for reference. Notice that
the vector encyphering produced cyphertext with a much smoother character distributions.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the 4-graph cyphertext with the distribution of the digraph
cyphertext for reference. The character count variances for the digraph and 4-graph cyphertexts
are approximately 515 and 261 respectively, significantly less than the 10100 of the multidigit
digraph cyphertext example. A visual inspection of the cyphertexts show a smoother look to the
paragraph breaks with the vector cyphers than the previous ones, agreeing with the numerical
measurement.
3.3 Vigenère Cyphers - An Historical Note
The Vigenère cypher was the first historical attempt at a block cypher, and was used successfully
for several centuries until cryptanalysis caught up with it.2 In practice, it was an extension of a
2Koblitz, 66. [4]
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Affine Vector digraph Cyphertext
Affine Vector 4-graph Cyphertext
Figure 3.4: Character distribution of example vector 4-graph cyphertext of the Declaration of
Independence
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single character shift cypher to a rotating key sequence. The key sequence was usually associated
with an easily remembered key word. The first letter of the word was the shift key for the first
letter. The second letter of the word was the shift key of the second letter. When all the letters
of the key word were used, the first would be used again in a repeating cycle.
Example 3.4. If the key word being used in a Vigenère cypher were “Petunia,” then the first
letter’s key would be P, the second letter’s key would be E, . . . the seventh letter’s key would be
A, the eighth letter’s key would be P again. Suppose we wanted to encypher the message “The
king has a mistress.” with a Vigenère cypher using the keyword “Petunia.” We could write our
plaintext on one line, repeat the word ‘petunia’ under it, and cypher one letter at a time as so:
THEK I NGHAS AM I ST RE S S
PETUN I AP ET UN I AP ETUN
ELXGV VGWEL UZQSE VXMF
The Vigenère cypher could be considered a block cypher. However, rather than the block
being encyphered together, each character of the block is encyphered separately, with a shift
cypher. This still gives the effect of smoothing the character distribution of the cyphertext, thus
prohibiting a direct statistical analysis of the entire character distribution. But once the block
size is known, the cyphertext can be fractured according to position in the block, and a simple
statistical analysis on the character distribution of each block position will lead to the discovery
of each respective key.
The Vigenère cypher may be classified as a special case of the vectorm-graph transformation
where the multiplicative portion of the key, A, is the identity matrix. The keyword determines
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the entries of the shift portion, b. For example, a keyword of “Petunia” would represent a cypher
key of b = [15 4 19 20 13 8 0]T .
3.4 Matrix m-graphs
3.4.1 Single-sided Affine Transformations
Rather than mapping blocks ofm characters into vectors of lengthm, they could also be mapped
into matrices of size j × k where m = jk. If the encyphering transformation is of the form
f(P ) = AP + B then A should be an element of Mj(R) and b an element of Rj×k. This type
of scheme, however, will be little more secure than a j-graph vector cypher. When the block of
size n is broken into k sub-blocks of size j and those arranged as the k columns of the j × k
matrix P , what gets created is a vector parallel to the Vigenère cypher: Each j-graph vector
sub-block gets encyphered with the key (A, bi) where bi cycles through the columns of B.
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The extra flexibility of choosing an arrangement of the characters into the j × k matrix
merely adds a permutation layer. This layer does not affect the statistical complexity.
If the arrangement of the m characters were not known, then the transformation could
be modeled as an m-graph vector transformation. The m-graph vector model of the same
transformation would line all m entries of the block in a vertical vector. If the length-j sub-
blocks of the m-graph vector do not correspond exactly with columns of the original j×k matrix
P , then that difference is a simple m×m permutation matrix. This same permutation matrix
would also be the difference between the original j×k matrix B and the models length-m vector
B′.
The vector transformation model’s A′ will be an m ×m matrix. Since each element of C
was originally determined by exactly one row of A and j elements of P , then each row of A′ will
have m− j zero elements and the other j will be an arrangement of the elements from one row
of A. Since each row of A originally contributed to exactly k elements of C, then each row of
A will be represented by exactly k rows of A′. Each of A’s j rows will populate k rows of A′,
accounting for all m = jk rows of A′.
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Only kj2 entries of A are (likely) non-zero, and those contain only j2 (permittedly) unique
values, each occurring k times. Furthermore, the kj2 non-zero entries will be distributed equally
over the jk rows, j in each row, with none of the j2 distinct entries occurring twice on the same
row. Note that if the original j × j A has multiple entries of the same value, then that value
will occur the same number of times as often in the m×m A′.
Example 3.6. Transform the 3×3 matrix transformation into a 9-graph vector transformation
and verify that the new 9 × 9 matrix in the vector transformation will also be invertible if the
original 3× 3 A is.
The length-9 vectors P ′ and B′ will be
P ′ =
[
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To compute a properly corresponding C ′ of
C ′ =
[




a1,1p1,1 + a1,2p2,1 + a1,3p3,1 + b1,1
a2,1p1,1 + a2,2p2,1 + a2,3p3,1 + b2,1
a3,1p1,1 + a3,2p2,1 + a3,3p3,1 + b3,1
a1,1p1,2 + a1,2p2,2 + a1,3p3,2 + b1,2
a2,1p1,2 + a2,2p2,2 + a2,3p3,2 + b2,2
a3,1p1,2 + a3,2p2,2 + a3,3p3,2 + b3,2
a1,1p1,3 + a1,2p2,3 + a1,3p3,3 + b1,3
a2,1p1,3 + a2,2p2,3 + a2,3p3,3 + b2,3
a3,1p1,3 + a3,2p2,3 + a3,3p3,3 + b3,3

,
requires the use of
A′ =

a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
a3,1 a3,2 a3,3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 a3,1 a3,2 a3,3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 a1,1 a1,2 a1,3
0 0 0 0 0 0 a2,1 a2,2 a2,3
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C = AP +B =
[
Ap1 + b1 Ap2 + b2 Ap3 + b3
]
,
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The reader may easily verify that if C = AP +B, then C ′ = A′P ′ +B′.
Lastly, |A′| = |A|3, so A′ will be invertible if, and only if, A is.
Example 3.6 demonstrates what could be called a standard mapping of a character block
into a matrix, where each column, from left to right, is filled from top to bottom. Any other
arrangement can be converted into a vector block, like in Example 3.6, and if the coefficient
matrix A′ and constant shift vector B are multiplied by appropriate permutation matrices, then
the message vectors P ′ and C ′ can be equated with message blocks in the standard, same-order
sequence manner.
3.4.2 Double-sided Affine Transformations
Rather than a transformation of the form f(P ) = AP +B, a matrix transformation could also
use a transformation of the form f(P ) = APB + C, where if P ∈ Rm×n, then A ∈ GLm(R),
B ∈ GLn(R), and C ∈ Rm×n. The key space is now GLm(R) × GLn(R) × Rm×n, the size of
which is O(|R|m2+n2+mn).
This type of transformation is, also, able to be converted to one of a simpler form like the
single-sided transformation above was. While, in general, it is not possible to convert a right-
hand multiplication like PB into a left-hand of the form B′P with a fixed B′ and variable P , the
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double-sided m×n matrix affine transformation can be converted into a single-sided length-mn
vector transformation just like the single-sided matrix transformation above.
For this, we’ll introduce some extra notation. First, the act of vectorizing a matrix, M , by
stacking its columns on top of each other will be notated with the vec operator. Thus if M is an
n×m matrix, then vecM is an mn-length column vector. Additionally, the column of a matrix
shall be denoted with a single subscript in the following.
A new matrix product, known as the Kronecker Product, shall be denoted with the ⊗
operator.
Definition 3.7 (Kronecker Product). If A is a k× l matrix and B is an m×n matrix, then the
Kronecker product A⊗B is a km× ln matrix formed by left distributing B to each element of
A. 
a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,l
a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,l
...
... . . .
...




a1,1B a1,2B · · · a1,lB
a2,1B a2,2B · · · a2,lB
...
... . . .
...
ak,1B ak,2B · · · ak,lB

Theorem 3.8. A matrix transformation of the form f(P ) = APB + C where A ∈ GLm(R),
B ∈ GLn(R), and P,C ∈ Rm×n is convertible to one of the form f(P ) = A′P ′ + C ′ where
A′ ∈ GLmn(R) and P ′, C ′ ∈ Rmn.3
3The proof of this is essentially copied from Horn and Johnson, 254-255. [3]
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Proof. We’ll first examine the kth column of the product APB.










































This distribution of A into the summation will eventually become a Kronecker product of a
matrix with A. At this point we may reinterpret the summation as a vector inner product and
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Remember that this is just the kth column of APB. The vectorization of APB will result in
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And so, not only do we know that a transformation exists to vectorize P and C, but we also
know the form of the transformation. The important part is that the same vector-based analysis
may be used by an attacker whether the actual transformation is a vector, single-sided matrix
or double-sided matrix transformation. Note also, that the single-sided matrix vectorization of
Example 3.6 is a special case of the double-sided one where the right-hand matrix is just an
identity, I.
The time involved in using a double-sided matrix transformation on a plaintext message is
dominated by the matrix multiplications. There are m2n multiplications in R when multiplying
by A and mn2 multiplications in R when multiplying by B. If R = Zl, then each multiplication
requires O((lg l)2) time, but there are only 1mn of them. The full transformation will therefore
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require O((m + n)(lg l)2) time. With a keyspace of O(lm2+n2+mn), a brute-force attack would
require O(lm2+n2+mn(m+ n)(lg l)2) time.
Compare this with the time requirements for an mn vector transformation: O(mn(lg l)2)
transformation time and O(l(mn)2+mn)-size keyspace. The vector transformation has a usage




= lm2n2−m2−n2 times larger, the
breakage requirement is mnm+n · lm
2n2−m2−n2 times harder. A vector transformation with the
same block size seems favorable to a matrix transformation.
3.5 Combining m-graph Methods
Different m-graph methods may also be used together. The most simple combination would be
to use multiple digit m1-graphs as the base ring elements in a vector or matrix m2-graph. This
is especially true with computers.
Computers use the byte (8-digit binary numbers) as their base unit of storage. This produces
a natural 256-letter alphabet with a natural mapping to Z256. However, the base unit (or perhaps
more properly called the optimal unit) for mathematical operations may be 2, 4, or 8 bytes,
depending on architecture, and is called a word. On a computer that can natively (in hardware)
handle 32-bit operands (4 bytes), it would be very convenient to use multiple digit 4-graphs
mapped to Z232 . Even more convenient, is the fact that arithmetic operations will naturally
wrap around from 232 − 1 to 0, easing the requirements for a mod operation to always follow.4
A 32-bit arithmetic processor will naturally work with integers mod 232.
4Computer programmers refer to this “feature” as overflow when modular computations are not desired.
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Once the characters of a plaintext message are grouped into words of length 4 (for example),
Z232 may then be used as the base ring to form m-graphs (of words now, not characters) into
vectors or matrices.
Section 2.5.2 discussed the composition of affine encypherings and demonstrated that it was
only beneficial when a different ring was used for each encyphering. With all these different
m-graph techniques, it is not hard to find two or more different rings in which to work. Even
using the same m-graph technique with different sizes of blocks will suffice. And while the net
result will be a block cypher with a block size of the lcm of each of the component block cyphers,
the resultant cypher may not be representable as an affine cypher, and the associated keyspace
would then not form a group structure.
Example 3.9. Take the notes of Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star (in the key of C-Major), written
in the seven-character alphabet X = {A, . . . G} (neglecting note lengths):
C C G G A A G F F E E D D C G G F F E E D G G D D E E D C C G G A A G F F E E D
D C.
Let the notes be represented by the ring Z7 in alphabetical order with A = 0 and G = 6. First
encypher the sequence as multidigit 2-graphs (in the ring Z72 with the key (45, 8). First collect
the message in groups of two and then convert the groups of two to elements of Z49 considering
the first element of each pair as the 7’s digit.
CC GG AA GF FE ED DC GG FF EE DG GF FE ED CC GG AA GF FE ED DC
16 48 0 47 39 31 23 48 40 32 27 47 39 31 16 47 0 47 39 31 23
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Next apply the affine transformation c = 45p+8 then convert the resulting elements of Z49 back
to character pairs.
42 12 8 16 48 31 14 12 44 27 47 16 48 31 42 12 8 16 48 31 14
GA BF BB CC GG ED CA BF GC DG GF CC GG ED GA BF BB CC GG ED CA
Next collect the characters into groups of three and convert them to elements of Z73 .
GAB FBB CCG GED CAB FGC DGG FCC GGE DGA BFB BCC GGE DCA
295 253 118 325 99 289 495 261 340 189 85 65 340 161
Then encypher them with the key (177, 140) in Z73 and convert back to tri-graphs.
219 331 103 41 170 186 12 32 295 322 93 326 295 168
EDC GFC CAF AFG DDC DFE ABF AEE GAB GEA BGC GEE GAB DDA
These two encypherings in series have the effect of a 6-graph encyphering. However it is certainly
not a multidigit, 6-graph affine cypher. As 6-graphs, the first two blocks of the final cyphertext
would correspond to the values 75,448 and 35,370 in Z76 respectively. The first two blocks of
the original plaintext correspond to the values 40,768 and 114,789 in Z76 respectively. Using
these two blocks, a known plaintext attack yields the system of equations
75, 448 =40, 768a+ b
35, 370 =114, 789a+ b
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Using a computerized algebra software such as Sage5 or Maxima6, because working by hand in
a ring this big is tedious, yields a solution of the key (17912, 86375). The next two blocks of
cyphertext correspond to the values 58,496 and 4148 respectively and the next two blocks of
plaintext correspond to the values 57,615 and 78,202 respectively. Setting up a system of equa-
tions and solving for the key again gives 7 possible keys that work with this pair: {(6495, 90540),
(23302, 6505), (40109, 40119), (56916, 73733), (73723, 107347), (90530, 23312), (107337, 56926)}
(like the system in Example 2.17 this one need not have a single unique solution because it is








The encyphering systems of Chapters 2 and 3 belong to the class of symmetric cryptosystems.
The cryptosystems of this chapter are asymmetric.
Definition 4.1 (Asymmetric cryptosystem). A cryptographic system where knowledge of one
of the pair of keys is “easily” computable from knowledge of the second, but knowledge of the
second is computationally “difficult” from knowledge of the first.
The affine transformations of Chapters 2 and 3 all have relatively easily computed inverses,
and the encyphering transformations themselves are just as easily computed from their inverses.
With asymmetric cryptosystems, the key from which the other can be “easily” computed is con-
sidered the decyphering key and the key from which it would be “difficult” to compute the other
is considered the encyphering key. In practice, a participant in an asymmetric cryptosystem
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makes his encyphering key publicly available, and keeps his decyphering key private. The two
keys, therefore, are commonly referred to as the public key and the private key. And by virtue
of this public key, asymmetric cryptosystems are commonly called public-key cryptosystems.
The security of an interaction between two parties using a symmetric cryptosystem is de-
pendent upon the pre-existing knowledge of the encryption keys by both parties and the secrecy
of those same keys from all other (or at least all untrusted) parties. For both interested parties
to already know the secret key, it would have to have been agreed upon at an earlier meeting.
For no third parties to know the key, the meeting where it was agreed upon must have been
absolutely secure and the key must not have been cracked by an eavesdropper. For example, if
Alice and Bob want to pass notes to each other in English class, but because they sit in opposite
corners of the room and don’t want anyone else to be able to read their notes decide to encrypt
their messages with a symmetric encryption, they must agree on a key sometime before class,
somehow so that no one else in class knows the key.
A third party would only need to crack the key once, and discover either the encyphering or
the decyphering key. Once one is known the other may be easily computed and the third party
will have covertly gained full privileges to the secret conversation. With this knowledge, the
third party could continue eavesdropping (now in knowledge of the correspondence), decrypt
saved messages that had been encyphered with the key before he cracked it, and/or impersonate
one or both of the members of the secret conversation. The third party is now capable of sending
encrypted messages to the legitimate participants (alleging to be the other legitimate member),
and could fully hijack the conversation if he is capable of intercepting the legitimate messages
and blocking their delivery.
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With a symmetric cryptosystem, a group of parties may all share one key for secret messages
amongst themselves, but if two parties of the group wish to converse without the others, they
must share a separate key for just themselves. If every distinct pair of parties sets up a symmetric
key, then there will be as many keys as handshakes (n(n−1)2 ). Furthermore, if every possible set
of 3 parties, and every possible set of 4 parties, and every possible set of 5 parties, etc. . . want
to set up a symmetric key to be able to communicate to the exclusion of the rest of the group,
then the number of required keys will be close to 2n.
In asymmetric cryptography, when one party desires to send a message to a second, he
transforms the message with his private key, which only he knows, then transforms that result
with the intended recipients public key, which had been made public knowledge. Upon receipt,
the recipient transforms the cyphertext with his private key, which only he knows, inverting the
senders second transformation, then transforms that result with the senders public key, which
had been made public knowledge, inverting the senders first transformation. Suppose party
A’s public key performs the transformation fA and private key performs the transformation
fA
−1, and party B’s public key performs the transformation fB and private key performs the
transformation fB−1. When party A wants to send a message to party B, party A encyphers
the plaintext message with
C = fB(fA−1(P )).
Upon receipt, party B decyphers the cyphertext with
fA(fB−1(C)) = fA(fB−1(fB(fA−1(P )))) = fA(fA−1(P )) = P.
For example, if Alice and Bob decide to use an asymmetric cyptosystem for passing notes
84
4.1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 4. EXPONENTIAL CYPHERS
in English class, they may agree in front of everyone (except perhaps the teacher) to do so,
each go to his/her seat and generate a key pair, then share their public keys publicly. When
Alice uses fB in encyphering a message to Bob she knows that only Bob will be able to invert
(decypher) it, and when Bob uses fA in decyphering the message he knows that only Alice
could have encyphered it. The messages are both secure (only the recipient will get them) and
authenticated (the sender is verified to be as claimed).
With an asymmetric cryptosystem, only one key (public-private pair) is needed for each
individual party, and any pair of parties may then communicate to the exclusion of everyone
else. However, sharing messages among more than two parties requires a separate encyphering for
each recipient. In practice, nearly all encrypted conversations involve only two parties anyway.
In general, an encyphering transformation is considered practical if encyphering with f and
decyphering with f−1 take time no longer than on the order of a polynomial in logn where n is
the size of the ring used. The transformation is considered asymmetric if decyphering a message
knowing only f (cracking the key) requires time at least on the order or a polynomial in n.1
Such a transformation, f , is called a trap-door function, because a message could be easily
encyphered (fall through the trap door) by anyone with Alice’s public key, but it could not be
easily decyphered (escape back out through the trap door) except by Alice who has the private
key.
Definition 4.2 (Trap-door function). A trap-door function is an invertible function f : X → Y
such that
• f(x) is “easy” to evaluate for any x ∈ X and
1Koblitz, 88. [4]
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• y = f(x) is “difficult” to solve for x given a y ∈ Y .
Such trap-door functions are best found in historically difficult problems. The two histori-
cally difficult problems whose derived cryptosystems will be described here are that of factoring
an integer into prime factors and evaluating the discrete logarithm.
4.2 Prime Factorization
Given two or more prime integers, it is fairly simple to compute their product. However, given
a composite integer, it can be very difficult to compute its prime factorization. The difficulty
of factoring an integer into it’s prime factors is the basis for the security of the RSA public-key
cryptosystem.
The process of generating a key pair for RSA encryption proceeds as follows: First, two
prime numbers are chosen at random, p and q. Their product is calculated, n = pq. The size
of the group of units of Zn is calculated, φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1). An invertible element of Zφ(n)
is chosen at random, e. The inverse of e in Zφ(n) is calculated, d. The public key is K = (e, n)
and the private key is K−1 = (d, n). Encyphering involves mapping m-graphs into Zn and
transforming them with the function
C = f(P ) = P e mod n.
Decyphering is performed with the inverse function
P = f−1(C) = Cd mod n = P ed mod n = P 1 mod n.
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These functions are inverses because e and d were chosen so that they would be. For any
x ∈ Zn, unit or not, the multiplicative, cyclic group or semi-group, respectively, 〈x〉 will have
an order dividing φ(n). Therefore, because φ(n) divides (ed− 1), |〈x〉| will also divide (ed− 1)
and xed = x. As a side note, knowing the structure of Zn = Fp×Fq, ed need only be congruent
to 1 (mod gcd(p− 1, q − 1)). It would, therefore, be advisable that when choosing one’s p and
q, one chose a pair whose p− 1 and q − 1 have the fewest common multiples possible. (As they
are both odd, a common factor of 2 will be unavoidable.)
The RSA cryptosystem is dependent of the difficulty of factoring integers, because if the
factorization of n were known, then the inverse of any number in Zφ(n) could be easily calculated
with the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.
Example 4.3. Encypher and then decypher the message
Call me Ishmael.
in a 33-character alphabet by appending ‘"’=32 to the 32-character alphabet in Table 2.5 on
page 48 with the encryption key (3, 33).
Note that 33 = 3 · 11, φ(33) = 2 · 10 = 20 and 3−1 ≡ 7 (mod 20).
First, convert the characters to their representatives in Z33.
(2, 0, 11, 11, 26, 12, 4, 26, 8, 18, 7, 12, 0, 4, 11, 28)
Then, raise each element to the third power in Z33.
(8, 0, 11, 11, 20, 12, 31, 20, 17, 24, 13, 12, 0, 31, 11, 7)
And convert each element of Z33 back to a character of the chosen alphabet.
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IALLUM:RUYNMA:LH
Decyphering will follow the reverse steps backwards. Convert the cyphertext to elements of
Z33.
(8, 0, 11, 11, 20, 12, 31, 20, 17, 24, 13, 12, 0, 31, 11, 7)
Raise each element to the seventh power.
(2, 0, 11, 11, 26, 12, 4, 26, 8, 18, 7, 12, 0, 4, 11, 28)
And convert each element back to a character to reveal the plaintext.
CALL ME ISHMAEL.
Example 4.3 is unrealistic for multiple reasons. First, the chosen modulus is too small to
be secure, though this was done intentionally so that the procedure could be the focus of the
example. Second, the encyphering was performed on single characters, rather than blocks. And
finally, the size of the alphabet was the same as the key’s modulus.
The reason it is unrealistic for the modulus and alphabet size to be the same, is that every
participant should have a different modulus. Each participants modulus is the product of their
secret pair of prime numbers. If any two also had the same modulus, they would know the
factorization of each others modulus and be able to decypher messages intended for the other.
For participants to send each other messages, they need an agreed-upon alphabet and block
size. But if the moduli of the participants are all different, then how could the alphabets and
block sizes be the same? This is handled by selecting a larger alphabet and/or block size for
the cyphertext messages than the plaintext messages. Each participant chooses their p and q
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such that the product is between the moduli for the two text bases. If lP and lC are the sizes of
the plaintext and cyphertext alphabets respectively and mP and mC are the block sizes of the
plaintext and cyphertext messages respectively, then each participant chooses his p and q such
that lPmP ≤ n = pq < lCmC . The blocks of text each get interpreted as multidigit m-graphs.
The order in which transformations are applied is determined by modulus size.
Suppose Alice has a modulus of nA and Bob has a modulus of nB . When Alice sends Bob
a message she applies the transformations in the order of increasing modulus. If nA < nB , then
Alice first applies her private key (mod nA), then applies Bob’s public key (mod nB), and sends
Bob
C = fB(fA−1(P )).
If nB < nA, then Alice first applies Bob’s public key (mod nB), then applies her private key
(mod nA), and sends Bob
C = fA−1(fB(P )).
When Bob receives the message he applies the transformations in the order of decreasing mod-
ulus. If nA < nB , then Bob first applies his private key (mod nB), then applies Alice’s public
key (mod nA) and reduces that result (mod lPmP ) to read
fA(fB−1(C)) = fA(fB−1(fB(fA−1(P )))) = fA(fA−1(P )) = P.
If nB < nA, then Bob first applies Alice’s public key (mod nA), then applied his private key
(mod nB) and reduces that result (mod lPmP ) to read
fB
−1(fA(C)) = fB−1(fA(fA−1(fB(P )))) = fB−1(fB(P )) = P.
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The flow of events will look either like




fB−−→ ZnB → ZlCmC → mC-graphs→ C




fA−−→ ZlPmP → mP -graphs→ P,
or like




−−−→ ZnA → ZlCmC → mC-graphs→ C




−−−→ ZlPmP → mP -graphs→ P.
Example 4.4. Use the standard 26-letter alphabet from Table 2.2 for both the plaintext and
cyphertext. Use 3 character blocks for plaintext and 4 character blocks for cyphertext. Use a
private key of (78701 = 101−1,124931 = 271 · 461) and encypher the following message for a
recipient with a public key of (101,122431).
O ROMEO O ROMEO WHEREFORE ART THOU ROMEO
The plaintext should first be grouped into 3-graphs and converted into elements of Z263 .
ORO MEO ORO MEO WHE REF ORE ART THO URO MEO
(14:17:14, 12:4:14, 14:17:14, 12:4:14, 22:7:4, 17:4:5, 14:17:4, 0:17:19,
19:7:14, 20:17:4, 12:4:14)
(9920, 8230, 9920, 8230, 15053, 11601, 9910, 461, 13040, 13966, 8230)
Since the recipient’s key has the smaller modulus, his will be used first. Each entry in the
latest vector shall be raised to an exponent of 101 (mod 122431). Exponentiation by repeated
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squaring will be demonstrated here in a Zl ring on the first entry only. See Section 1.6.3 for the
description of the procedure.
99202i Running product
i 101 (mod 122431) (mod 122431)
1
0 1100101 9920 9920
1 1100101 94307 9920
2 1100101 55116 96305
3 1100101 15484 96305
4 1100101 34358 96305
5 1100101 114893 68740
6 1100101 13460 29333
(29333, 43110, 29333, 43110, 9902, 30040, 110028, 43397, 75323, 46988, 43110)
Now each entry gets raised to an exponent of 78701 (mod 124931).
(3138, 55108, 3138, 55108, 124825, 64615, 10857, 33987, 17985, 16826, 55108)
Then convert to 4-graphs in the 26-letter alphabet.
(0:4:16:18, 3:3:13:14, 0:4:16:18, 3:3:13:14, 7:2:16:25, 3:17:15:5, 0:16:1:15,
1:24:7:5, 1:0:15:19, 0:24:23:6, 3:3:13:14)
AEQS DDNO AEQS DDNO HBQZ DRPF AQBP BYHF BAPT AYXG DDNO
According to Theorem 1.19 in Section 1.6.3, each exponentiation will require O((lg e)(lgn)2)
or O((lg d)(lgn)2) time. Each of d and e are elements of Zφ(n) and thus have magnitudes of
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O(φ(n)) = O(n). And n = O(lCmC ). If the plaintext and cyphertext use the same alphabet (it
is standard that each computer byte is an element of Z256) then the subscript on the l can be
dropped. And once l is fixed then mP and mC differ by a fixed multiple, so the subscript on
the m may also be dropped. Now, each exponentiation will require O((lg lm)3) = O(m3(lg l)3)
time. For any specific plaintext, only O( 1m ) as many exponentiations will be required, thus using
this exponential cypher requires O(m2(lg l)3) time. This is one order of magnitude larger than
a vector transformation, which requires O(m(lg l)2) time, of the same block size, which makes
perfect sense as exponentiation is repeated multiplication.
4.3 The Discrete Logarithm
Another arithmetic operation that historically has been computationally difficult is the discrete
logarithm: the evaluation of the logarithm of an element in a discrete field.
In the Real Numbers and in discrete fields, exponential functions are (relatively) easy to
evaluate. The repeated squaring method keeps evaluation time down. The exponential function’s
inverse, however, is not so simple.
In the case of the Real Numbers, exponential functions are smooth and continuous. Real
logarithms tend to be irrational numbers but can be approximated with several calculus-based
methods. This ease comes from the niceness of an exponential curve, as depicted in Figure 4.1.
Exponential functions in discrete fields have a much more random appearance to them. This
makes estimation of a logarithm in a discrete field “difficult.” The proximity of two inputs to an
exponential function appears to have little relation to the proximity of the outputs. Examine
92











Figure 4.1: Exponential function in R.
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the function y = 6x in Figure 4.2. Notice that while 5 and 6 differ by only one, 65 and 66 differ












Figure 4.2: Exponential function in Z13.
This random appearance can be seen more clearly in larger fields. Figure 4.3 shows y = 12x
in Z139. This exponential function clearly illustrates that estimating discrete logarithms is
probably impossible, and calculating them is rather “difficult.” This apparent randomness of
the discrete exponential function is utilized in the generation of pseudo-random numbers.2
2Menezes, §5.5, p. 185-187. [5]
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Figure 4.3: Exponential function in Z139.
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4.3.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
As exponentiation is an order of magnitude more (computationally) expensive than multiplica-
tion, public-key cryptosystems using it are also significantly more expensive to use than classical,
symmetric-key cryptosystems. As such, public key systems require significantly more time to
use than classical systems. For this reason, public key systems are usually employed as an
augmentation to a classical system, rather than as a replacement for one.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a method by which two previously unacquainted parties
may publicly agree to a classical cryptosystem’s key, under the security of a public key system.
First the two parties agree to a discrete field and a generator, g, of a cyclic subgroup, 〈g〉, of
the multiplicative group of units. Preferably, g is chosen to generate the entire group of units,
so as to permit the greatest number of possible classical system keys. A mapping from the
generated group to the classical systems’ keyspace is agreed upon. Each party then selects a
random integer, α and β respectively (these are their private keys), in the range [0, |〈g〉|) and
calculate the respective powers of g. The parties trade their powers of g, gα and gβ (these are
their public keys). The key to be used in their classical cryptosystem communiqués is the one
represented by gαβ , which each may calculate by raising the other parties power of g to their
own power. Let’s illustrate this exchange with an example.
Example 4.5. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to initiate a classical cryptosystem-encoded con-
versation with a secret key decided by a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Alice and Bob have agreed to use the 26-letter alphabet of Table 2.2 with an affine, character
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transformation of the form
f(p) = ap+ b.
Alice and Bob agree to use the field Z677 with g = 2, which is a generator of the group of
units. The group of units Z677∗ has exactly 676 = 262 elements, which, very conveniently, is the
exact same size as the keyspace, Z262. It is not necessary to get a 1-1 correspondence between
the generating field and the keyspace, but a roughly equal chance of each key is important for
security.
Alice and Bob agree to a mapping of gαβ to (a, b), i.e. from Z677∗ to Z262. The mapping from
the field’s group of units to the key space will begin by reducing the obtained gab (mod 676) (if
necessary). The element of Z262 will be converted to an element of Z262 by writing it in base-26,
the digits of which will be the 2 elements of the key.
If the obtained a is not an invertible element of Z26 then Alice and Bob will choose two new
random exponents.
Alice and Bob choose random exponents, α and β, less than 676: Alice chooses 674 and
Bob chooses 136 at random.
Alice and Bob each calculate their public key (gα and gβ respectively) by raising the gen-
erator g to their respective powers (α and β) in Z677: Alice calculates gα = 2674 = 508 and Bob
calculates gβ = 2136 = 148.
Alice and Bob trade their individual public keys and each calculate their shared private key,
gαβ : Alice calculates gαβ = (gβ)α = 148674 = 189 and Bob calculates gαβ = (gα)β = 508136 =
189.
Alice and Bob, individually, each write 189 in base-26 (no reduction mod 676 is necessary
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this time) as 7:7. They each verify that 7 is an invertible element of Z26, so they will use the
encryption key (7, 7). They can each calculate the decryption key with relative ease from the
encryption key to decode each other’s messages.
This example used a numeric field of prime size. It is also common in practice to use a
Galois field with polynomial representation and map the coefficients into the key elements.
If a weak classical system is used after a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, then it would be
easily broken. However, if a reasonably strong classical system is used, and a different key is
chosen randomly for each conversation between two parties, then their keys will not be easily
broken. An adversary will have a significantly reduced chance of accumulating enough cyphertext
by the same key for an accurate statistical analysis attack and will have to resort to a more
computationally intensive attack against the classical cypher or the discrete logarithm.
The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange depends not only on the difficulty of solving
the discrete logarithm but the difficulty of the related problem of computing gab from only ga
and gb. While, clearly, with a solution to the discrete logarithm to the base g, a and b can be
computed separately and then gab computed, but it remains an open question whether gab could
practically be computed directly from ga and gb without solving the discrete logarithm.3 It is
commonly assumed that such a computation would be equally difficult, if not even equivalent
to solving the logarithm.
Definition 4.6 (Diffie-Hellman Assumption). It is computationally infeasible to compute gab
knowing only ga and gb.
3Koblitz, 99. [4]
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4.4 Signatures
Signatures provide a digital method of source verification. Rather than information security
or secrecy, the purpose of signatures is information authenticity. A message’s signature affirms
that whom the message claims as its author is actually the message’s author.
Signatures are useful when it isn’t important for a message to be secret, but it is important
that it not be tampered with during transmission. This is becoming more common as more
media is being purchased digitally and downloaded over the Internet. It may not be important
to encrypt an ebook, song, video, or piece of software, but it is important to know that the file
downloaded is exactly the same as was sent: that an interlocutor has not injected a virus or
other malware or in any other way tampered with the recently purchased merchandise.
Signatures use a type of cryptographic function called a hash function.
Definition 4.7 (Hash function). Let P be the set of all plaintext messages and S a finite set.
Then a hash function, f : P → S, is a function such that
• f(P ), for P ∈ P, is “easy” to compute.
• y = f(P ), for a fixed y ∈ S, is “difficult” to solve for P .
The primary difference between a hash and a trap-door from Page 85, is that a hash is
many-to-one, while the trap-door functions are one-to-one. Being many-to-one, means that the
word “solve” must be used in a more broad sense. It must be “difficult” to find a message for a
given hash, find a message whose hash matches a given message, or find any two messages with
the same hash. When two inputs to a hash function have the same output it is called a hash
collision.
99
4.4. SIGNATURES CHAPTER 4. EXPONENTIAL CYPHERS
Example 4.8. Polynomials are well-known by elementary algebra students to be easy to eval-
uate but hard to solve. Consider p(x) = 7x2 + 9x + 15 ∈ Z263 [x]〈x3−1〉 which we intend to use for
messages in our standard 26-character alphabet of Table 2.2 to generate hashes three characters
long. We will use this polynomial in the following manner: We will initialize the running hash,
h0, to 0, then for each character, x, of a message, we compute the next running hash value with
the formula hi = p(hi−1 + x) (in Z263).
Let us use this hash function to calculate a hash for the message
START.
i x hi = p(hi−1 + x) hi as text
1 S = 18 p(18) = 7(182) + 9(18) + 15 = 2445 DQB
2 T = 19 p(2445 + 19) = 7(24642) + 9(2464) + 15 = 4919 HHF
3 A = 0 p(4919 + 0) = 7(49192) + 9(4919) + 15 = 5149 HQB
4 R = 17 p(5149 + 17) = 7(51662) + 9(5166) + 15 = 8945 NGB
5 T = 19 p(8945 + 19) = 7(89642) + 9(8964) + 15 = 16307 YDF
The final hash of the message is “YDF.” Naturally, this example hash is not strong enough for
real-world use. It’s small size makes a brute-force search for messages whose hashes collide a
short exercise and the use of a quadratic p make direct algebraic solving attempts practical.
Real-world hashes are significantly longer (256 to 1024 bits) and tend to make heavy use
of vectors of words (16-, 32- or 64-bits each), with bitwise operations (or, and, not and xor),
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bitwise rotations, and permutations being performed on the elements of the running hash (state)
vector and message block vector.
The general method used to sign a message starts with the author generating the hash,
h = f(P ), of the plaintext message, performing a private-key encyphering on the hash value, and
sending the encyphered hash with the message. The recipient computes the hash of the received
plaintext, possibly after decyphering the cyphertext, uses the author’s public key to decypher
the signature, and compares the two values. If the two values match then the authenticity of
the received message is confirmed.
Example 4.9. Suppose Alice wants to send the message
Once more
to Bob. She plans to use the standard 26-character alphabet of Table 2.2. To ensure that the
message cannot be tampered with or forged, she will sign her message with her RSA private
key of (7, 143 = 11 · 13). Her public key (103, 143) is already known to Bob who is expecting all
messages from Alice to be signed using her key. Alice and Bob also planned to use the hash of
Example 4.8.
Alice does not plan on encyphering the whole message. In this case it is not important to
be secret, as long as Bob can be guaranteed of the authenticity of any message claiming to be
from Alice.
Alice first calculates the 3-character hash of the message using the same method described
above. This comes out to IHB. Alice may then encypher the hash (going from 1-graphs in Z26
to 2-graphs in Z262), and get the signature of CFAGAB. Alice appends the signature to the
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message and either sends them as-is, or may encypher the whole packet with Bob’s public key.
Bob recieves the message. If Alice encyphered with his public key, he decyphers with his
private key. He segregates the signature from the message. He hashes the message to get IHB.
He applies Alices public key to the signature and also gets IHB. Since the hashes match, he may
consider the message to be authentic.
There are only two ways that a plaintext message could be tampered with such that the
signature matches. First, an imposter could resign the tampered message with the “author’s”
key, but that would require breaking the “author’s” key, which is “difficult.” Second, the imposter
could modify the message in a way that leaves the hash unchanged, but that would require a
solution to the hash function, which is also “difficult.” Thus, signatures affirm the authenticity




This chapter explores a small sample of the known ways to solve the two “hard” problems
from Chapter 4 upon which the security of the related private-key cryptosystems depends. A
“success” is considered when a method is found that grows logarithmically with the length of
the inputs, i.e. when a method runs twice as long when the input is squared, rather than when
the input is doubled. Success is also counted when the time requirement for an algorithm is
a polynomial of the logarithm of the input, e.g. O((lnn)k). These are labeled as running in
polynomial time, being referenced to the logarithm of the input. Failures, whose running time
of a polynomial of the inputs, are labeled as running in exponential time, also with regard to
the logarithm of the input, e.g. O(nk).
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5.1 Prime Factorization
RSA encryption depends on the difficulty of factoring large integers. One that possesses an-
other’s public key, but not private, knows a composite integer n, but not any of its factors.
Definition 5.1. The integer factorization problem. Given a composite integer n, find a (not
necessarily prime) 1 < p < n such that p is a factor of n.
By repeatedly finding proper divisors, the full prime factorization will eventually be found.
A sample of common methods of integer factorization follows.
5.1.1 Naïve Trial Division
Naïve factoring works rather quickly on very small integers (less than 20 digits or so). It has no
initial setup or overhead, and jumps straight into the work. The principle is simple: try dividing
the integer, n, by every prime less than its square root,
√
n. Some implementations forgo the
effort of identifying prime numbers by trying to divide by every odd integer.
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Thus, 611 = 13× 47.
Again, that may not seem so bad for such a small n (or more particularly, for an n with
such small factors), but when n is 123463, then the first prime divisor found won’t be until 331.
In an RSA application, n has only two factors that differ in length by only a few digits. The
running time will then grow roughly with the square root of n.
5.1.2 Pollard’s p− 1 Algorithm
Pollard’s p − 1 factoring algorithm depends on Fermat’s Little Theorem and the Chinese Re-
mainder Theorem.
Theorem 5.3 (Chinese Remainder Theorem). If R is a Principal Ideal Domain (which Z is),









× · · · × R
〈un〉
.
The isomorphic transformation from left to right is simply reduction mod ui at each coor-
dinate. The transformation from right to left is much trickier. It usually occupies the bulk of
the discussion of the Chinese Remainder Theorem in an introductory text on number theory,
and the formulas involved in solving such a system of modular congruences is irrelevant to this
theoretical discussion. This vast difference in difficulties in navigating the isomorphism in the
two directions make this a trap-door function.
The Chinese Remainder Theorem may be stated more simply with regard to an RSA appli-
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cation:
Zpq ∼= Zp × Zq,
where
a 7→ (a mod p, a mod q).
Fermat’s Little Theorem, when stated in a number theoretic context, can look rather im-
pressive.
Theorem 5.4 (Fermat’s Little Theorem). If p is a prime integer and a is relatively prime to p
(gcd(a, p) = 1), then ap−1 ≡ 1 (mod p), or in other words, p divides ap−1 − 1.
In an algebraic context, Fermat’s Little Theorem merely says that the order of each element
of the group of units of the ring Zp, divides p − 1 if p is prime. But if p is prime then Zp is
a field and the size of its group of units is p − 1. LaGrange’s Theorem says the order of each
element of a group divides the size of the group.
There are composite numbers, n, such that every a ∈ Zn∗ has an order dividing n− 1, even
though n− 1 6= |Zn∗|. This will happen whenever n is the product of distinct primes and each
p − 1 divides n − 1.1 If n =
∏l
i=1 pi then every a ∈ Zn∗ will have an order dividing gcd({pi})
which itself divides n− 1 because each p− 1 does. For example, 561 = 3 · 11 · 17 is one such n:
φ(561) = 2 · 10 · 16 where each p− 1 divides 560.
Pollard’s p − 1 method of factoring works best when one of the factor fields is smooth: its
group of units has many subgroups. Specifically, for an RSA number n = pq, either p − 1 or
q − 1 has only small prime factors. Suppose n = pq and p − 1 is smooth. Let a be any integer
1Koblitz, 128. [4]
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strictly between 1 and n. Let k be a product of lots of small prime numbers, for example k = K!
or k = lcm(1, 2, . . . ,K). Then ak 7→ (ap, aq)k = (apk, aqk). If p− 1 divides k but q− 1 does not,
then apk will equal 1 (in Zp), aqk probably won’t (in Zq), so ak − 1 will be a multiple of p (in
Zn). Thus p = gcd(n, ak − 1) and a factoring of n has been found. If p − 1 does not divide k
either, then gcd(n, ak − 1) = 1 and a larger (with more bigger factors) k should be tried.
Example 5.5. Factor n = 123463 with Pollard’s p− 1 method.
First, pick an a from {2, . . . , n− 1}. This may be done randomly or systematically. Let us
use a = 2. Quickly check the gcd of a and n in case of a lucky guess. In this case the gcd is 1,
so 2 is not a factor of 123463.
Second, find a product of a lot of small numbers. Let’s use k = lcm(1, 2, . . . , 4) = 12.
Calculate ak−1 in Zn. In practice this is done using the repeated squaring method described
in Section 1.6.2 in O((lg k)(lgn)2) time. 212 − 1 = 4095.
Calculate the gcd of ak − 1 and n. This can be done in O((lgn)3) time with the Euclidean
Algorithm as shown in Theorem 1.20. gcd(4095, 123463) = 1.
The gcd came out to 1. This means that the k used was too small, it is missing at least one
factor of p− 1. Let’s try again with a larger k. Let’s use k = lcm(1, 2, . . . , 8) = 840.
Calculate ak − 1 in Zn. 2840 − 1 = 72820.
Calculate the gcd of ak − 1 and n. gcd(72820, 123463) = 331.
If the gcd is strictly between 1 and n, then a non-trivial factor was found. Divide n by that
factor to find the other factor. n = 331× 373.
If the gcd is n, then try a smaller k or a different a. We might have tried a = 3 next had
our first try been unsuccessful. This example would require a very large k to end up with a gcd
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of 123463. 372 factors into 22 · 3 · 31. So k would have to be a multiple of 31 before the gcd
would be 123463. In fact, since 2 generates Z373∗, k would have to be a multiple of 4, 3 and 31.
The three major time-consuming steps are the calculations of k, ak and the gcd. Calculating
k involves roughlyK multiplications of sizeK×k, running inO(K(lgK)(lg k)) time. Calculating
ak runs in O((lg k)(lgn)2) time. And calculating the gcd runs in O((lgn)3) time. Since k =
O(eK), the whole algorithm runs in O(K2(lgK) + K(lgn)2 + (lgn)3) time. Simplifying this
estimate requires a relationship between K and n.
The actual K required can vary greatly depending on the smoothness of both n and p− 1
for each prime factor p. A smoother n has more prime factors, meaning that they will tend to
be smaller (at least one will have to be), and a smaller p means a smaller p − 1. And smaller
p − 1’s mean smaller factors of p − 1 which require a smaller k and/or K. For each p | n, the
largest factor of p− 1 is the critical one in determining the required K.
If R is the set of greatest prime factors of the p − 1’s, and r is the least of these greatest
prime factors, then this r is the key determining factor and the running time will be O(r lnnln r )
multiplications, according to Menezes.2 The worst case running time for Pollard’s p−1 algorithm
is when n = pq (only two factors, exactly what RSA is), and p − 1 and q − 1 each have
a very large factor, being of the form 2 · r. The smallest r, a required factor of k, will be
roughly equal to 12
√
n. This case is not very likely, but still a possible worst-case, with a
running time of O(n 12 lgn +
√
n(lgn)2 + (lgn)3) = O(n lgn). Plugging in r =
√
n to Menezes’
estimate and multiplying by the time of each multiplication would give O(
√
n(lgn)2) if it were
presumed that each multiplication were mod n, or at least on the order of n, which is slightly
2Menezes, 93. [5]
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better than our estimate. Menezes actually gives a slightly more efficient method of computing
k = lcm(1, 2, . . . ,K) and ak that does keep each multiplication on the order of n, while our
estimate of multiplications on the order of K × k to calculate the lcm is higher and ended up
dominating our estimate.
5.1.3 Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Algorithm
The points of an elliptic curve,3 including ones over finite fields, form an additive group structure.
The group of points of an elliptic curves over Zpq are isomorphic to the cross product of the
groups of points of the elliptic curves over Zp and Zq. This allows the equivalent of Pollard’s p−1
algorithm to be used on the group of points on an elliptic curve over Zn to find a factorization:
with multiples of a chosen point replacing powers of a.
The computations involved in working with points on an elliptic curve are more intense
than computing with integers, but this extra computational intensity is made up for by a key
difference in the group structures of elliptic curves and integral groups of units. The size of the
group of units of a field Zp is always p − 1, and that is why Pollard’s p − 1 algorithm depends
on at least one smooth p− 1 from the factors of n, which is not often enough the case. The size
of an elliptic curve over the field Zp can vary from p+ 1− 2
√
p to p+ 1 + 2√p,4 and will vary
within this range over different curves even for the same p.
This freedom in the actual size of the curve over Zp increases the chance of finding an elliptic
curve whose number of points is a smooth enough number to permit a successful factoring with
3For an easy introduction to elliptic curves and a detailed explanation of Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Factoring
Algorithm, please see Silverman’s Rational Points on Elliptic Curves. [8]
4Silverman, 107-110. [8]
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a significantly smaller K than would be required by Pollards p − 1 Algorithm. This increased
chance, however, is not a guarantee, so, while it is significantly more efficient than Pollard’s
p − 1 algorithm, Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Algorithm still has a running time dependent on the
nature of the factors of n and will run too slowly on non-preferred values of n. In it’s worst case,




5.1.4 Fermat’s Factorization Methods
The running times of Naïve Trial Division, Pollard’s p−1 Algorithm and Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve
Algorithm are dependent on the character of the factorization of the integer in question. Because
of this, they tend to lose effectiveness on larger numbers, where such special characteristics
become rarer, and are thus considered special purpose algorithms. Their running times grow
with either the smoothness of n or of the groups involved (p− 1 or the smoothest size of a used
elliptic curve over Zp), rather than directly with the size of n.
Fermat’s Factorization Method serves as the framework for the currently used general pur-
pose algorithms. The running times of these algorithms tend to be more dependent on the size
of n than on the characterization of its factorization. This is beneficial for attacks on RSA keys,
where the p and q are intentionally chosen so that special purpose factoring algorithms like the
ones previously described are impractical in an attack.
The basis of Fermat’s Factorization Method is the Difference of Squares special form bino-
5Menezes, 94. [5]
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mial:
a2 − b2 = (a+ b)(a− b).
All odd numbers can be expressed as a difference of squares, 2k + 1 = (k + 1)2 − k2.
(“Trial” division can extract all factors of 2 quite easily.) Once such a difference-of-squares
expression is found, then the number can be factored as a difference of squares. In practice an
exact difference of squares representation, n = a2−b2, is not needed, but merely a congruence of
squares, a2−b2 ≡ 0 (mod n), such that a and b themselves are neither congruent nor congruently
opposite (a  ±b), otherwise one of the two factors would be congruent to n.
Once an appropriate congruence of squares is found, a2 ≡ b2 (mod n) where a 6≡ ±b
(mod n), then a proper factorization is found. Since a 6≡ ±b (mod n), then n will divide neither
a + b nor a − b. But since (a + b)(a − b) ≡ 0 (mod n) n does divide their product. Therefore,
each of the difference-of-squares factors contains a proper factor of n, which can be found by
finding the gcd of the factor and n.
Example 5.6. The number 15 = 3× 5 is odd.
15 may be expressed as 16− 1 = 42 − 12 = (4 + 1)(4− 1) = 5 · 3.
15 may also be expressed as 64 − 49 = 82 − 72 = (8 + 7)(8 − 7) = 15 · 1. However, this
expression of 15 as a difference of squares will not yield a factorization because 8 ≡ −7 (mod 15),
8 + 7 ≡ 0 (mod 15).
The congruence of squares 49 ≡ 4 (mod 15) holds. 45 = 49− 4 = 72− 22 = (7 + 2)(7− 2) =
9 · 5. Once we have this factoring, calculating gcd(9, 15) = 3 which properly divides 15 and
gcd(5, 15) = 5 which also properly divides 15.
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The congruence of squares 49 ≡ 484 (mod 15) holds. 435 = 484 − 49 = 222 − 72 =
(22 + 7)(22 − 7) = 29 · 15. Calculating the gcd’s reveals 1 and 15. This was because 22 ≡ 7
(mod 15) and therefore 22− 7 ≡ 0 (mod 15).
Naïve Search




n is the geometric
mean of p and q). Then a quick search along the sequence (a2 − n)a>√n will find a square, b2,
such that a2 − b2 ≡ 0 (mod n). Knowing this, RSA pairs of primes are chosen so that p and
q differ in size by at least a couple digits, rendering such a naïve search a linear-time pursuit.
Thus, merely searching the sequence (i2 − n)i>√n for a square is considered a special purpose
algorithm ultimately on par with trial division on worst-case running time, yet with significantly
higher rates of worst-case occurrences.6
Example 5.7. Factor 123463 by naïvely searching for a difference of squares representation.
Start with a = d
√
123463e = 352.
3522 − 123463 = 441 = 32 ∗ 72
Therefore 123463 factors as (352− 21)(352 + 21) = 331 ∗ 373.
This example aptly demonstrates the ease by which a number may be factored with a naïve
Fermat factorization search when p and q are close. When p and q are not close a naïve search
will be impractical. In such cases a congruence of squares may be found by multiplying an
6Pomerance, 1474. [6]
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appropriately chosen set of a2 ≡ a2 − n (mod n) relations. Clearly the product of the first
components, which are all squares, will also be one. Finding a subset of pairs whose product of
ai
2−n (mod n) ∈ Zn is a square is usually accomplished by factoring them in Z and inspecting
the parity (even vs. odd) of the exponents on their prime factorizations. A set whose product
contains only even exponents in the prime factorization will yield a congruence of squares relation
which, if the roots are not themselves equal or opposites in Zn, will allow a factoring of n in Z
as a difference of squares.
Example 5.8. Factor 36181 with Fermat Factorization.
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Start searching with a0 = d
√
36181e = 191.
1912 ≡ 300 = 22 · 3 · 52
1922 ≡ 683 = 683
1932 ≡ 1068 = 22 · 3 · 89
1942 ≡ 1455 = 3 · 5 · 97
1952 ≡ 1844 = 22 · 461
1962 ≡ 2235 = 3 · 5 · 149
1972 ≡ 2628 = 22 · 32 · 73
1982 ≡ 3023 = 3023
1992 ≡ 3420 = 22 · 32 · 5 · 19
2002 ≡ 3819 = 3 · 19 · 67
2012 ≡ 4220 = 22 · 5 · 211
2022 ≡ 4623 = 3 · 23 · 67
2032 ≡ 5028 = 22 · 3 · 419
2042 ≡ 5435 = 5 · 1087
2052 ≡ 5844 = 22 · 3 · 487
2062 ≡ 6255 = 32 · 5 · 139
2072 ≡ 6668 = 22 · 1667
2082 ≡ 7083 = 32 · 787
2092 ≡ 7500 = 22 · 3 · 54
A congruence of squares is found with only 2 relations: a = 191 and a = 209. Thus
(1912)(2092) ≡ (22 · 3 · 52)(22 · 3 · 54) = 24 · 32 · 56 (mod 36181). 191 · 209 ≡ 3738 (mod 36181)
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and 22 ·3 ·53 = 1500, which are neither equal nor opposite (mod 36181), so a helpful congruence
of squares is found and a proper factoring follows. gcd(3738−1500, 36181) = 373 and gcd(3738+
1500, 36181) = 97. Therefore 36181 = 97 · 373.
Often times, for at least two reasons, when looking for a congruence of squares, a “small”
set of primes is chosen as a factor base, and only the a2− n that factor over this set of primes
are retained to find an appropriate subset to multiply together. First, the point of this Fermat
Factorization is to avoid factoring large prime factors out of a number, it would be costly to
factor large primes out of the reductions of the a2. Second, by restricting the search to a2 whose
reductions factor over a predetermined set of primes one limits the difficulty of finding a set
whose product is a square.
This allows each a2 − n to be represented by a finite-length vector of the exponents of its
prime factorization. And since only the parity of the exponents is a concern, they may be
reduced mod 2 and considered members of F2m where m is the number of primes in the factor
base. Now finding a set of relations whose product is a square is equivalent to finding a set of
exponent vectors in F2m whose sum is 0, or, in other words, is linearly dependent.
Example 5.9. Let’s factor n = 1234589 by finding a system of prime factorizations to multiply
together. Notice that n = 277 · 4457. These two factors are separated enough that a linear
search for a straight a2 − b2 = n will take a long time. Trial division, actually, would work
very quickly with such a small factor as 277. But let’s collect the factorizations of the modular
residues of a2 that have no prime factors over 50, to find a square product thereof.
Start searching with a0 = d
√
1234589e = 1112. But only record when the prime factorization
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after the modular reduction has only factors less than 50.
11122 ≡ 1955 = 5 · 17 · 23
11132 ≡ 4180 = 22 · 5 · 11 · 19
11292 ≡ 40052 = 22 · 17 · 19 · 31
11322 ≡ 46835 = 5 · 17 · 19 · 29
11422 ≡ 69575 = 52 · 112 · 23
11572 ≡ 104060 = 22 · 5 · 112 · 43
11582 ≡ 106375 = 53 · 23 · 37
11652 ≡ 122636 = 22 · 23 · 31 · 43
12082 ≡ 224675 = 52 · 11 · 19 · 43
12172 ≡ 246500 = 22 · 53 · 17 · 29
12272 ≡ 270940 = 22 · 5 · 19 · 23 · 31
At this point a square congruence is found with the following lines:
11122 ≡ 5 · 17 · 23
11292 ≡ 22 · 17 · 19 · 31
12272 ≡ 22 · 5 · 19 · 23 · 31
giving the congruence
(1112 · 1129 · 1227)2 ≡ (22 · 5 · 17 · 19 · 23 · 31)2 (mod 1234589).
But 1112 · 1129 · 1227 ≡ 22 · 5 · 17 · 19 · 23 · 31 (mod 1234589) so the search continues.
12432 ≡ 310460 = 22 · 5 · 192 · 43
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Quickly another congruence is found with 1157 and 1243, (1157 ·1243)2 ≡ (22 ·5 ·11 ·19 ·43).
This time the two roots are not congruent or congruently opposite, so a proper factorization
will follow.
gcd(1157 · 1243− 22 · 5 · 11 · 19 · 43, 1234589) =277
gcd(1157 · 1243 + 22 · 5 · 11 · 19 · 43, 1234589) =4457
The factor base may be freely chosen. There are trade-offs between large and small factor
bases, and an efficient balance is desirable. Too small a factor base will yield very few ai2 − n
that factor completely over the factor base, lengthening the time of that search. It would have
required a lot more searching to find congruences that factored into primes only up to 11 or 19 in
Example 5.9. Too large a factor base will increase the number of congruences necessary to find
a linearly dependent set, not necessarily increasing the length of the search for the congruences,
as more tried elements of the sequence will be factorable over the base, but certainly increasing
the size of the linear system and, thus, the computations required to solve it. There would
have been many more congruences in Example 5.9 if factoring into primes as high as 100 were
allowed, but then the system would have been much harder to deal with in searching for a set
to multiply.
An exploration into the time complexity of this algorithm is beyond the scope of this paper.
Pomerance discusses the running times of these more advanced factorization algorithms. The
time does depend on the chosen factor base, and will be too long if the factor base is either too
small or too large. The running time will be minimized when the chosen factor base is the set of
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The Quadratic Sieve is an efficient means of identifying which elements of the sequence ai2
(mod n) factor completely over the chosen factor base. Rather than trial dividing each ai2
(mod n) by all elements of the factor base, all the elements of a pre-compiled range of ai2
(mod n) that can be divided by each prime are identified, and that prime is divided out from
all of them.
A set of ai’s are chosen ahead of time, as is the factor base. Koblitz recommends a factor
base of B = {p ≤ P} where P is approximately e
√





nc + 2, . . . b
√
nc + A} where P < A < P 2.8 After running through all of the primes in
the factor base, B, any ai2 (mod n) that end up divided all the way down to 1 factors over the
factor base and passes to the next stage to find a square product.
Considering whether a2 (mod n) is divisible by a prime p is equivalent to considering when
p | a2 − n or a2 ≡ n (mod p). Therefore, if n is not a square in Zp, then p cannot divide a2 − n
for any a. This means that only the primes for which n is a square need to be retained in the
factor base. This piece of information could be used in the previous algorithm to reduce the
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Limiting the factor base this way will roughly cut the size of the factor base in half, as
half of all elements of a field (of odd characteristic) are squares. Also, limiting the factor base




2n, where the reduction of a2 is
equivalent to subtracting n. If any a’s are used where xn < a2 < (k + 1)n then those would
have to be sieved with kn (mod p) in the following manner rather than just n. Having to use
a’s all the way to
√
2n would end up with a running time of at least ‰(
√
n) in which case trial
division would have been just as well. This may only happen for small enough n where a simpler
algorithm would be faster. For large enough n, the asymptotic running time given at the end
of this section will be better than ‰(
√
n).
Further a2 ≡ n (mod p) ⇔ a ≡ ±
√
n (mod p). Thus a2 (mod n) will be divisible by p if,
and only if, a is congruent to one of the square roots of n (mod p). The congruence x2 ≡ n
(mod p) need only be solved once for each prime. Then for each root, xi, identify an ai that
is congruent to it (mod p). Not only will that ai2 (mod n) be divisible by p, but so will every
ai + kp2 (mod n) be divisible by p. Thus roughly 2p of all the ai2 (mod n) can be divided by
each prime, and they can all be easily (faster than by trial division) identified. “Trial” divisions
now need only be done when divisibility is already known, and are thus no longer “trial.”
The above will identify only one factor of each prime. To identify prime factors of higher
multiplicities (such as the 4 that divides 60), the above steps should be repeated, for each prime,
modulo each successive power of the prime, until a power α is found for which no ai is congruent
to a square root of n (mod pα). Once p is divided out for all ai’s congruent to a
√
n (mod p),
the search should be repeated for ai’s that are congruent to a
√
n (mod p2) and a second p
divided from their entries. Repeat this for p3 and so on, until a power is reached for which no
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more congruent ai’s are found. After which, move on to the next prime.
It is a basic fact of number theory that for the odd primes, being a square in any particular
Zpα guarantees being a square in all Zpα , thus the same set of primes are to be checked regardless
of power. This will have two important implications for us. Firstly, that if (the reduction of) n
is a square in Zpα , then it is also a square in Zp, meaning that once the set of primes are set
for the factor base considering the primes’ first powers, no extras are needed for higher powers.
Secondly, once we find square roots mod p, we should keep looking for, and will keep finding
square roots mod each successive pα until they’ve spread far enough out that no more are found
in the chosen range of ai’s.
Theorem 5.10. For any odd prime, p, if n (not a multiple of p) is a square in one Zpα then
it is a square in all Zpα . Only 1 is a square is Z2, Z4 and Z8, and being a square in one Z2α is
equivalent to being a square in all other Z2α for α ≥ 3.
Proof. This will be a simple proof by induction on α. First we’ll show that if n is a square in
Zpα then it is a square in Zp1 . This includes p = 2.
If n is a square in Zpα then there exists an x such that x2 ≡ n (mod pα) ⇒ pα | x2 − n.
That also means that p | x2 − n and so n is also a square in Zp.
And now the inductive step: if n is a square in Zpα then it is also a square in Zpα+1 , when
p is an odd prime.
If n is a square in Zpα then there exists an x such that x2 ≡ n (mod pα) ⇒ pα | x2 − n.
But that x is not unique, any number congruent to x (mod pα) will also work, so we can say
that pα | (x+ kpα)2 − n for any k ∈ Z. For the following simplification, we’ll use the fact that
pα divides x2 − n to write x2 − n in the form pαl.
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pα |(x+ kpα)2 − n
= x2 + 2xkpα + k2p2α − n
= pαl + 2xkpα + k2p2α
= pα(l + 2xk + k2pα)
Because 2 and x are units in Zp, k may be chosen so that 2xk = −l, or in other words
p | l + 2xk. Therefore, an additional p may be factored out from (l + 2xk + k2pα) and pα+1 |
(x+ kpα)2 − n. Therefore n is also a square in Zpα+1 .
In Z2, 1 is the square of itself. In Z4, 1 is the square of 1 and 3. In Z8, 1 is the square of
1, 3, 5 and 7. Thus, while all odd n will be squares in Z2 (n ≡ 1 (mod 2)), only half of those
will be squares in Z4 (n ≡ 1 (mod 4), but not 3), and only half of those will be squares in Z8
(n ≡ 1 (mod 8), but not 5), though they will have 4 square roots.
The inductive step above only worked for odd primes because 2 is not a unit in Z2α . The
above inductive step will only yield a square in Z2α+1 if l is even, if n were already a square in
Z2α+1 : x2 − n = l2α = l2 2α+1.
Suppose now that l is odd. Note that x is also odd. Let k be another odd number and
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consider
(x+ k2α−1)2 − n = x2 + 2xk2α−1 + k222α−2 − n
= x2 − n+ xk2α + k222α−2
= l2α + xk2α + k222α−2
= (l + xk)2α + k222α−2.
Because l, x and k are all odd, l+xk is even and so contains another factor of 2. If 2α−2 ≥ α+1,
which happens whenever α ≥ 3, then the entire expression will be a multiple of 2α+1. Therefore
2α+1 | (x + k2α−1)2 − n, meaning that (x + k2α−1)2 ≡ n (mod 2α+1), than n is a square in
Z2α+1 .
As primes are divided out of the ai2’s, record should be kept of how many of each prime in
the factor base were divided out, and the remaining quotient after all primes in the factor base
are divided out. The set of all ai which factor completely over the factor base (leave a quotient
of 1 after all primes in the base have been fully divided out during the sieving) should then be
segregated out for further computations. These are the ai’s whose prime factorizations of ai2
should be examined for a set whose product is a square.
Being a square means that all of the exponents in the prime factorization are all even. When
sets of congruences are multiplied together, the exponents of the prime factors get added. In
identifying which ones will multiply to a square (only even exponents) only the mod 2 reductions
of the exponents need to be considered: p2 is as much a square as p4 and as p6, likewize p is as
much not a square as p3 and p5.
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The simplest way to find the set of prime factorizations which is a square, is by converting
the prime factorizations into vectors of the exponents (mod 2). At that point, all that needs
to be found is a linearly independent set of vectors whose sum is the zero vector. Once that is
found, then those vectors included in the sum will correspond precisely with the factorizations
whose product is a square.
Example 5.11. Use the quadratic sieve to filter the congruences when factoring 36181.
First a factor base should be chosen. As mentioned earlier, a good choice is the set of all




36181 ln ln 2
√
36181 ≈ 5.09. So our factor base will be
all primes less than or equal to 5 for which 36181 has quadratic residue, which is all of them
because 36181 ≡ 1 mod each of them. For out set of ai’s, a quick glance up at Example 5.8
shows that only 18 were needed, which is in the earlier stated range, but for pedagogical reasons,
let us choose A = 25 for maximum impact. Thus, our table would start as follows.
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Sieving shall be performed by increasing primes. 36181 is congruent to 1 (mod 2) and is also
congruent to 1 (mod 4), but to 5 (mod 8). 36181 is congruent to 1 (and is therefore a square)
mod 2 and 4, but not 8. For each ai congruent to 1 (mod 2) (which are the square roots of n
in Z2, which are all the odd ai, ai2 − n will be divisible by 2. Next, for each ai congruent to
1 or 3 (mod 4) (which are the square roots of 1 in Z4), also all the odd ai, ai2 − n is divisible
by another 2. However, since 5 is not a quadratic residue (mod 8), no ai2 − n is divisible by
a third 2. Therefore 22 can be factored out of every other entry leaving odd cofactors behind.
The table may be updated as follows.
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ai ai
2
191 300 = 22 · 75
192 683 = 683
193 1068 = 22 · 267
194 1455 = 1455
195 1844 = 22 · 461
196 2235 = 2235
197 2628 = 22 · 657
198 3023 = 3023
199 3420 = 22 · 855
200 3819 = 3819
201 4220 = 22 · 1055
202 4623 = 4623
203 5028 = 22 · 1257
204 5435 = 5435
205 5844 = 22 · 1461
206 6255 = 6255
207 6668 = 22 · 1667
208 7083 = 7083
209 7500 = 22 · 1875
210 7919 = 7919
211 8340 = 22 · 2085
212 8763 = 8763
213 9188 = 22 · 2297
214 9615 = 9615
215 10044 = 22 · 2511
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Because 36181 ≡ 1 (mod 3), for any ai that is congruent to 1 or 2 (mod 3), ai2− 36181 will
be divisible by 3: 191 + 3k and 193 + 3k. 36181 is also congruent to 1 (mod 9), so a second 3
can be factored out for the ones congruent to 1 and 8: 197 + 9k and 199 + 9k. 36181 is also
congruent to 1 (mod 27), so a third 3 can be factored out for 215, which is congruent to 26 (mod
27). 215 is also congruent to 53 (mod 81), whose square, 55, is congruent to 36181, so a fourth
3 can be factored out for 215. 36181 is congruent to 217 (mod 35 = 243), whose square roots
are 109 and 134. None of the ai are congruent to 109 or 134 (mod 243), so no more 3s can be
factored. The quadratic sieve table now looks as follows.
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ai ai
2
191 300 = 22 · 3 · 25
192 683 = 683
193 1068 = 22 · 3 · 89
194 1455 = 3 · 485
195 1844 = 22 · 461
196 2235 = 3 · 745
197 2628 = 22 · 32 · 73
198 3023 = 3023
199 3420 = 22 · 32 · 95
200 3819 = 3 · 1273
201 4220 = 22 · 1055
202 4623 = 3 · 1541
203 5028 = 22 · 3 · 419
204 5435 = 5435
205 5844 = 22 · 3 · 487
206 6255 = 32 · 695
207 6668 = 22 · 1667
208 7083 = 32 · 787
209 7500 = 22 · 3 · 625
210 7919 = 7919
211 8340 = 22 · 3 · 695
212 8763 = 3 · 2921
213 9188 = 22 · 2297
214 9615 = 3 · 3205
215 10044 = 22 · 34 · 31
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Proceeding the same way with powers of 5, a 5 can be factored out for 191+5k and 194+5k.
36181 is congruent to 6 (mod 25), whose square roots are 9 and 16, so a second 5 can be factored
out for 191 and 209. 36181 is congruent to 56 (mod 125), whose square roots are 41 and 84, so
a third 5 can be factored out for 209. 36181 is also congruent to 556 (mod 625), whose square
roots are 209 and 416, so a fourth 5 can be factored out for 209. But the square roots of 36181
(mod 55) are 834 and 2291, so no more 5s can be factored out.
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ai ai
2
191 300 = 22 · 3 · 52
192 683 = 683
193 1068 = 22 · 3 · 89
194 1455 = 3 · 5 · 97
195 1844 = 22 · 461
196 2235 = 3 · 5 · 149
197 2628 = 22 · 32 · 73
198 3023 = 3023
199 3420 = 22 · 32 · 5 · 19
200 3819 = 3 · 1273
201 4220 = 22 · 5 · 211
202 4623 = 3 · 1541
203 5028 = 22 · 3 · 419
204 5435 = 5 · 1087
205 5844 = 22 · 3 · 487
206 6255 = 32 · 5 · 139
207 6668 = 22 · 1667
208 7083 = 32 · 787
209 7500 = 22 · 3 · 54
210 7919 = 7919
211 8340 = 22 · 3 · 5 · 139
212 8763 = 3 · 2921
213 9188 = 22 · 2297
214 9615 = 3 · 5 · 641
215 10044 = 22 · 34 · 31
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The sieving is done. Any entry still containing a factor that is not a member of the factor
base, will not factor over the factor base and will be discarded. The factorizations presented
in this final table are not necessarily prime factorizations, even though many of them are. The
final factor is merely the product of all the prime factors that are not members of the factor




191 300 = 22 · 3 · 52
209 7500 = 22 · 3 · 54
In an actual RSA scale application, there will be tens of thousands of lines with tens of
thousands of prime factors. This example is interesting in that there are not enough lines to
guarantee a linearly dependent set of exponent vectors, though such a set does exist, notably
because both exponents of 2 and 5 are even. When rewritten as a matrix of exponents reduced












Clearly the not-trivial solution is  1
1
 ,
implying that 1912 · 2092 ≡ 24 · 32 · 56, yielding the factoring described above.
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The Quadratic Sieve algorithm has a running time of O(e
√
(lnn)(ln(lnn))) to factor the inte-
ger n.9 While this growth rate is the same as for Lenstra’s Elliptic Curve Algorithm,10 actual
running times will differ by a constant factor. The Quadratic Sieve algorithm has faster prac-
ticals, and so gains the benefit of the constant factor between the two running times. This is
mostly due to the fact that the Quadratic Sieve is working in a much easier group, basic integers
in a Zl as opposed to two-dimensional points on an elliptic curve.11
The General Number Field Sieve
The Quadratic Sieve algorithm has now been superseded by the General Number Field Sieve
with better asymptotic behavior. Its fanciness and complexity are beyond the scope of this
paper, but a brief overview will be given.
One chooses a degree, d, and builds an irreducible, monic polynomial, f , whose coefficients
are in the range of d
√
n, and an integer, m, such that m is also in the range of d
√
n and f(m) ≡ 0
(mod n). Then take one of the polynomial’s complex roots, α, the extension ring Z[α], and the
natural ring homomorphism Φ: Z[α]→ Zn by α 7→ m mod n.
With these tools in hand, a set of {(a−αb)} is chosen/found such that
∏
(a−αb) is a square
in Z[α]. Once this set is found, then a natural, and hopefully helpful, congruence of squares













12See Pomerance [6] and his references for additional practical concerns such as how to identify squares in Z[α]
and, once recognized, finding their square roots.
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to factor the integer n.13 This is a significant improvement over the Quadratic Sieve method,
but the extra complexities over the Quadratic Sieve render it’s use to larger n, from around 150
digits and larger.14
5.2 Discrete Logarithm
The difficulty of computing logarithms in a discrete field was touched upon in Section 4.3.
Solving a discrete logarithm involves finding the exponent required to raise a base to obtain a
given element.
Definition 5.12 (The Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given a cyclic group 〈b〉 and an arbitrary
member, g ∈ 〈b〉, find a natural number k ∈ N such that bk = g but i < k ⇒ bi 6= g
In cryptographic applications, a finite field is usually used and a b is found that generates
all of F∗ as the cyclic group. This maximizes the size of the group being used, which is desirable
for the security of the cryptosystem being implemented.
A sample of common methods of solving the discrete logarithm problem follows.
5.2.1 Naïve
Just as an integer may be factored by trial division, the logarithm of g = bk may be found by
evaluating all powers of b until the desired one is found, commonly known as trial multiplication.
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then roughly 12 |F| multiplications will be required on average, which puts the running time of
trial multiplication at O(|F|).
5.2.2 Silver-Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm
The Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm requires the knowledge of the size of 〈b〉, which is usually
known when b is a generator of the group of units of a known field, and the factorization of the
size. For a field of size q, the ease of finding the factorization of q−1 depends on the size and/or
smoothness of q − 1.15 The efficiency of the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm also depends on
the smoothness of q − 1. This algorithm will work best when q − 1 is smooth.
The Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm works by finding the residues of k mod each maximal
prime power dividing q − 1 then computes k by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Write the
prime factorization of q − 1 as
∏l
i=1 pi
αi . Then if the least positive residue of k mod each piαi ,
kp, can be found, then k can be calculated from the {kp} by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
The details can get murky, so we’ll demonstrate a simple example before describing the
algorithm, then show a more involved example.
Example 5.13. We’ll use the field Z101. 100 = 2252. At this point, many of the calculations
become too tedious to perform by hand, so an advanced calculator or computer algebra software
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Thus 2 is a generator of Z101∗. Let’s find log2 25 in Z101.
First we find the sets of square and fifth roots of unity. We’ll label the primitive roots r2
and r5, and the elements of the set as rp,j = rpj where j < p. Because 2 is a generator of Z101∗,













We’re trying to find the value of k where 25 = 2k. First we’ll find k2 = k (mod 4)
We start finding k2 = k (mod 4) by first thinking of k2 as a base-2 number: x1 : x0 =
x0 + 2x1. We’ll find x0 by evaluating 2550 and comparing the result with the square roots of
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unity.
2550 = 1 = r2,0.
Therefore x0 = 0. If it had been non-zero, then we would have divided 2 off of 25 before finding
x1.
To find x1 we’ll evaluate 2525 and compare the result with the square roots of unity.
2525 = 1 = r2,0.
Therefore x1 = 0 also. This means that k2 = 0, that k ≡ 0 (mod 4).
We’ll do the same work to find k5 = k (mod 25). k5 as a base-5 number would look like
x1 : x0 = x0 + 5x1. We’ll find x0 by evaluating 2520 and comparing the result with the fifth
roots of unity.
2520 = 87 = r5,3.
Therefore x0 = 3. Before finding x1 we’ll have to divide 23 off of 25 to get 2k−3.
25
8 = 41.
To find x1 we’ll evaluate 414 and compare the result with the fifth roots of unity.
414 = 84 = r5,4.
Therefore x1 = 4. This means that k5 = x0 + 5x1 = 3 + 5 · 4 = 23.
k2 = 0 and k5 = 23 gives the following system of congruences.
k ≡ 0 (mod 4)
k ≡ 23 (mod 25)
This system has the solution k ≡ 48 (mod 100). We can verify this by evaluating 248 = 25.
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To find each kp, the pth roots of unity must be calculated. These may be found as rp,j =
b
j(q−1)
pi for j = 0, 1, . . . pi − 1. Observe that this would require a large table for any large primes
dividing q− 1, hence the desire for a smooth q− 1. Each kpi may then be written as an αi-digit
number in base pi.
kpi = xαi−1 : xαi−2 : · · · : x1 : x0 = x0 + x1pi + · · ·+ xαi−1piαi−1















the result of which is one of the pth roots of unity and may be compared with the entries in the
table of roots of unity and x0 is the corresponding j.
Then let g1 = g · b−x0 . This subtracts x0 from k and kpi so that the next digit may be
found. At this point g1
q−1
pi would be 1 because g1 is a pi-multiple power of b: g1 = bpim for













to find x1 and let g2 = g1 · b−x1pi . Continue in this manner with increasing powers of pi until
all of kpi is found.
Repeat the above to find each kpi , then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute
k. Note that if the same group and generator thereof is used multiple times, then the table of
prime roots of unity need only be generated once.
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Example 5.14. Let F49 = F7[t]〈t2−2t+3〉 , and let b = t, a generator of F49
∗. Find the discrete
logarithm of g = 6t+1 to the base t in F49. As above, all computations should be performed with
algebra software for expediency, otherwise make good use of the method of repeated squaring.
Let’s verify that t is a generator by ensuring that neither the square nor cube root of t48 is
1. 48 = 24 · 3.
t2 = 2t− 3
t4 = (2t− 3)2 = 3t− 3
t8 = (3t− 3)2 = 3
t
48
3 = t16 = 32 = 2
t
48
2 = t24 = t16t8 = 2 · 3 = 6
And, indeed, 62 = 1 and 23 = 1. If t were not a generator of F49∗, it would have generated a
subgroup whose order divides 48 and one of those two powers of t would have equaled 1. So t
is a generator of F49∗.
Next, we find the pth roots of unity for each prime dividing 48: 2 and 3. The square roots
are r2,0 = t
0(48)
2 = 1 and r2,1 = t
1(48)
2 = 6 = −1. The cube roots are r3,0 = 1, r3,1 = t
1(48)
3 = 2
and r3,2 = t
2(48)
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To find k2, we first think of it as x0 +x1 ·2+x2 ·22 +x3 ·23 and compute the “digits” of this
“base-2 number.” First, compute g 482 = (6t + 1)24 = 1 = r2,0, so x0 = 0. Let g1 = gtx0 =
g
t0 =
6t+ 1. Second, compute g1
48
22 = (6t+ 1)12 = 1 = r2,0, so x1 = 0. Let g2 = g1t0·2 =
6t+1
1 = 6t+ 1.
Third, compute g2
48







24 = 23 = 1 = r2,0, so x3 = 0. Now,
k2 = x0 + x1 · 2 + x2 · 22 + x3 · 23
= 0 + 0 · 2 + 1 · 22 + 0 · 23
= 4
To find k3, we merely calculate g
48
3 = (6t+ 1)16 = 4 = r3,2, so k3 = 2. Nothing more with
higher powers of 3 needs to be calculated, because 3 divides into 48 only once.
To summarize the events so far, k ≡ 8 (mod 24) and k ≡ 2 (mod 3). This gives the following
system of congruences.
k ≡ 4 (mod 16)
k ≡ 2 (mod 3)
By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, this k, which clearly equals 20, is unique (mod 48).
Therefore 6t+ 1 = t20. This can be verified by evaluating it to check.
Presuming that q − 1 can be easily factored into q − 1 =
∏k
i=1 pi
ei , then this algorithm has
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5.2.3 Index-Calculus Algorithm
The Index-Calculus Algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem bears a striking re-
semblance to the Quadratic Sieve integer factoring algorithm. The Index-Calculus Algorithm
also uses a factor base and establishes linear relations of exponents of factorings over the se-
lected base. In solving the equation g = bx for g ∈ G = 〈b〉 the following steps constitute the
Index-Calculus Algorithm:
1. Select a factor base B = {pi} such that a “significant proportion” of the elements of G
will factor over it.




to generate the linear relations of the form k =
∑
ei logb pi until a dependent system is
found with which to solve for the logb pi.
3. Solve the system to solve for the logarithms of the factor base elements.
4. Select random (or systematic) k’s until one is found such that gbk factors over the factor
base, indicating that k + logb g =
∑
ki logb pi.
5. Evaluate logb g.
While step 3 depends on step 2, just like in the Quadratic Sieve Algorithm, and the individual
relations of step 2 can be found in parallel, just like in the Quadratic Sieve Algorithm, a factoring
of a gbk in step 4 can be found in parallel with the other two. And, similarly to the Quadratic
Sieve Algorithm, the Index-Calculus Algorithm also has a trade-off between the size of the factor
base, and therefore of the linear system, and the ease of filling the linear system.
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Example 5.15. Take the field F35 represented by F3[t]〈t5−t+1〉 where t generates F35
∗. Find the
logt(t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1).
We compute t22 = −t3 − t2 + t+ 1 and t121 = −1 to verify that t does generate all of F35∗.
35 − 1 = 242 = 2 · 112, so if t wasn’t a generator then one of those powers of t would have been
1.
It is customary to choose a factor base that is the set of all irreducible polynomials up to a
certain degree. It would be simple to try using a factor base of just the linears, but that turns
out to allow no more than 11 linearly independent factorizations of powers of t: -1 is the only
constant that can be counted, and has order 2. The modulus polynomial clearly indicates that
t5 = t− 1, which gives one linear relation of exponents (in fact it gives the logt(t− 1) = 5, but
also prevents higher powers of (t−1) being useful for generating independent linear relations, as
log(t− 1)α = 5α. Since much time could be spent looking in a field of 243 elements for one that
is a power of (t+ 1) up to 4 or an opposite thereof, a larger factor base should be considered.
Allowing irreducible monic quadratics adds t2 + 1, t2 + t − 1, and t2 − t − 1 to the factor
base. With a total of 6 irreducibles in the factor base, an element of F35 that factors thereover
could be found by selecting up to 4 of the six base elements (not even counting multiplicity),
















= 56 elements, which might be substantial enough.
Our factor base is B = {−1, t± 1, t2 + 1, t2 ± t− 1} and has 6 elements.
The first step is to find at least 6 k’s such that tk factors over B. In practice, extras are
usually found to compensate for the probable discovery of dependent relations. The first four
powers of t offer no information, so we’ll start at 5. We’ll also skip over any powers that give no
information, those will be the powers where there is no modular rollover (through a t5 = t− 1)
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from the preceding power.
t5 = t− 1 =
t9 = −t4 + t− 1 = −(t+ 1)(t3 − t2 + t+ 1)
t10 = t2 + t+ 1 = (t− 1)2
t13 = t4 + t3 + t− 1 = (t2 + 1)(t2 + t− 1)
t14 = t4 + t2 − 1 =
t15 = t3 − 1 = (t− 1)3
t17 = −t2 + t− 1 = −(t+ 1)2
t20 = t4 − t3 − t+ 1 = (t− 1)4
t21 = −t4 − t2 − t− 1 = −(t4 + t2 + t+ 1)
t22 = −t3 − t2 + t+ 1 = −(t− 1)(t+ 1)2
t24 = −t4 + t3 + t2 − t+ 1 = −(t4 − t3 − t2 + t− 1)
t25 = t4 + t3 − t2 + 1 = (t+ 1)(t3 − t+ 1)
t26 = t4 − t3 − t− 1 = (t2 + 1)(t2 − t− 1)
t27 = −t4 − t2 − 1 = −(t+ 1)2(t− 1)2
t28 = −t3 + t+ 1 = −(t3 − t− 1)
t30 = t3 + t2 − t+ 1 =
t32 = t4 − t3 + t2 + t− 1 =
t33 = −t4 + t3 + t2 − 1 = −(t− 1)(t3 − t− 1)
t34 = t4 + t3 + t+ 1 = (t+ 1)4
t35 = t4 + t2 − t− 1 = (t− 1)(t3 + t2 − t+ 1)
t36 = t3 − t2 − 1 = (t+ 1)(t2 + t− 1)
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Eight k’s have been found that are not higher powers of t− 1 and yield the following linear
relations of logarithms.
5 = log(t− 1)
13 = log(t2 + 1) + log(t2 + t− 1)
17 = log(−1) + 2 log(t+ 1)
22 = log(−1) + log(t− 1) + 2 log(t+ 1)
26 = log(t2 + 1) + log(t2 − t− 1)
27 = log(−1) + 2 log(t− 1) + 2 log(t+ 1)
34 = 4 log(t+ 1)
36 = log(t+ 1) + log(t2 + t− 1)
One of these logarithms, however, is already known. log(−1) was discovered when t was verified
to be a generator of the group of units at the beginning of this example and is 121. This
simplifies the system of equations to the following in only 5 unknowns.
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5 = log(t− 1)
13 = log(t2 + 1) + log(t2 + t− 1)
138 = 2 log(t+ 1)
143 = log(t− 1) + 2 log(t+ 1)
26 = log(t2 + 1) + log(t2 − t− 1)
148 = 2 log(t− 1) + 2 log(t+ 1)
34 = 4 log(t+ 1)
36 = log(t+ 1) + log(t2 + t− 1)
This system now has a pair (third and seventh) that are linearly dependent so one of them
may be discarded. We’ll discard the one in the seventh position. Our linear system of seven
equations now has the following matrix equation in Z242.

0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1
2 2 0 0 0






log(t2 + 1− 1)
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This system’s augmented matrix reduces in Z242 to
1 0 0 0 1 49
0 1 0 0 0 5
0 0 1 0 1 46
0 0 0 1 −1 229
0 0 0 0 2 202
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0





log(t2 + t− 1)




49− log(t2 − t− 1)
5
26− log(t2 − t− 1)








log(t2 + t− 1)











Now that the logarithms of the factor base elements are known. A search begins for another k
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such that (t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1)tk factors over B.
(t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1)t1 = −t4 + t3 − t2 − t− 1 = −(t+ 1)(t− 1)(t2 − t− 1)
And by quite a stroke of luck, such a k was found very quickly. Therefore
log((t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1)t) = log((−1)(t+ 1)(t− 1)(t2 − t− 1)
log(t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1) + 1 = 121 + 69 + 5 + 222
log(t4 − t3 + t2 − t+ 1) = 174
The running time of the Index-Calculus Algorithm depends on the selected factor base. A
judicious selection of a factor base is highly dependent on the working field. But if a optimal
factor base can be chosen, then the Index-Calculus Algorithm has an expected running time
of O(ec
√
lnn ln lnn), where n is the size of the working field and c is known to vary between
about 1.5 and 2 for the common fields of F2m and Zp respectively.17 Notice how similar this
algorithm is to the Fermat factorization with a factor base, their running times even have the
same asymptotic behavior (see page 118)
5.3 Conclusion
As stated at the beginning of this chapter (see page 103) success in the algorithms presented
here is considered to be when the running time can be expressed as a polynomial of the length
(number of bits/digits) of the inputs, a polynomial of the logarithm of the inputs. While some
of the best algorithms known have been presented, none of them are successful in this regard.
Nor are any of their more complex slightly faster superiors successful in this regard either.
17Menezes, 112. [5]
146
5.3. CONCLUSION CHAPTER 5. SOLVING “HARD” PROBLEMS
No algorithm is known yet for either of these problems whose running time can be expressed
like O((lnn)k). Though, neither are these more efficient algorithms considered failures, for their
running times are not polynomial in the inputs, they are not of the formO(nk). These algorithms
have running times that are faster than exponential, but still slower than polynomial, in the
log of the input. They have been written O(e(lnn)α(ln lnn)1−α). When written in this form, an
exponential-time algorithm will have an α of 1 while a polynomial-time will have an α of 0. The
better algorithms shown here and their superiors not examined here have running times with
α’s of 12 or
1
3 .
The difficulty of finding successful methods of solving these factorization and logarithm
problems has helped enforce these problems’ use as the foundations of our modern cryptosystems.
Without such earnest and fervent attempts, our trust in these systems would be unfounded. And,
yet, with such attempts, our trust may eventually be betrayed. It is still yet unknown whether
a polynomial-time algorithm is possible for either of these problems.
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The Declaration of Independence
A.1 Plaintext
When in the Course of human events , it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another , and to
assume among the powers of the earth , the separate and equal station to which
the Laws of Nature and of Nature ’s God entitle them , a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation .
We hold these truths to be self -evident , that all men are created equal , that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights , that among
these are Life , Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . --That to secure these
rights , Governments are instituted among Men , deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed , --That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends , it is the Right of the People to alter or
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to abolish it , and to institute new Government , laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form , as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness . Prudence , indeed , will
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and
transient causes ; and accordingly all experience hath shewn , that mankind
are more disposed to suffer , while evils are sufferable , than to right
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed . But when a
long train of abuses and usurpations , pursuing invariably the same Object
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism , it is their right ,
it is their duty , to throw off such Government , and to provide new Guards for
their future security . --Such has been the patient sufferance of these
Colonies ; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their
former Systems of Government . The history of the present King of Great
Britain [ George III] is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations , all
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these
States . To prove this , let Facts be submitted to a candid world .
He has refused his Assent to Laws , the most wholesome and necessary for the
public good.
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance ,
unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained ; and
when so suspended , he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of
people , unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in
the Legislature , a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual , uncomfortable , and
distant from the depository of their public Records , for the sole purpose of
fatiguing them into compliance with his measures .
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He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly , for opposing with manly
firmness his invasions on the rights of the people .
He has refused for a long time , after such dissolutions , to cause others to be
elected ; whereby the Legislative powers , incapable of Annihilation , have
returned to the People at large for their exercise ; the State remaining in
the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without , and
convulsions within .
He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States ; for that purpose
obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners ; refusing to pass
others to encourage their migrations hither , and raising the conditions of
new Appropriations of Lands .
He has obstructed the Administration of Justice , by refusing his Assent to Laws
for establishing Judiciary powers .
He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone , for the tenure of their offices ,
and the amount and payment of their salaries .
He has erected a multitude of New Offices , and sent hither swarms of Officers to
harass our people , and eat out their substance .
He has kept among us , in times of peace , Standing Armies without the consent of
our legislatures .
He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil
power .
He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our
constitution and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts
of pretended Legislation :
For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
For protecting them , by a mock Trial , from punishment for any Murders which they
should commit on the Inhabitants of these States :
150
A.1. PLAINTEXT APPENDIX A. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world :
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent :
For depriving us , in many cases , of the benefits of Trial by Jury:
For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences :
For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province ,
establishing therein an Arbitrary government , and enlarging its Boundaries so
as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the
same absolute rule into these Colonies :
For taking away our Charters , abolishing our most valuable Laws , and altering
fundamentally the Forms of our Governments :
For suspending our own Legislatures , and declaring themselves invested with power
to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever .
He has abdicated Government here , by declaring us out of his Protection and
waging War against us.
He has plundered our seas , ravaged our Coasts , burnt our towns , and destroyed the
lives of our people .
He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat
the works of death , desolation and tyranny , already begun with circumstances
of Cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages , and
totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation .
He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear
Arms against their Country , to become the executioners of their friends and
Brethren , or to fall themselves by their Hands .
He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us , and has endeavoured to bring on
the inhabitants of our frontiers , the merciless Indian Savages , whose known
rule of warfare , is an undistinguished destruction of all ages , sexes and
conditions .
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In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most
humble terms : Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated
injury . A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define
a Tyrant , is unfit to be the ruler of a free people .
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren . We have warned
them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an
unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the
circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to
their native justice and magnanimity , and we have conjured them by the ties
of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations , which , would inevitably
interrupt our connections and correspondence . They too have been deaf to the
voice of justice and of consanguinity . We must , therefore , acquiesce in the
necessity , which denounces our Separation , and hold them , as we hold the rest
of mankind , Enemies in War , in Peace Friends .
We , therefore , the Representatives of the united States of America , in General
Congress , Assembled , appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the
rectitude of our intentions , do , in the Name , and by the Authority of the
good People of these Colonies , solemnly publish and declare , That these
United Colonies are , and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States ;
that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown , and that all
political connection between them and the State of Great Britain , is and
ought to be totally dissolved ; and that as Free and Independent States , they
have full Power to levy War , conclude Peace , contract Alliances , establish
Commerce , and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of
right do. And for the support of this Declaration , with a firm reliance on
the protection of divine Providence , we mutually pledge to each other our
Lives , our Fortunes and our sacred Honor .
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A.2 Character Affine Encyphered Cyphertext
QV7ŤnŃŤnRV7n - IĞhİ7nIlnVĞ_cŤn7 <7 ŤRİjnŃRnŸ7MI_7İnŤ7M7İİch [ nlIhnIŤ7n ~7I~*7 nRInĆŃİİI
*<7 nRV7n ~I* ŃRŃMc * nŸcŤĆİnqVŃMVnVc <7
nMIŤŤ7MR7ĆnRV7_nqŃRVncŤIRV7hjncŤĆnRIncİİĞ_7nc_IŤ ! nRV7n ~
Iq7hİnIlnRV7n7chRVjnRV7nİ7 ~ chcR7ncŤĆn73Ğc * nİRcRŃIŤnRInqVŃMVnRV7n
cqİnIlntcRĞh7ncŤĆnIlntcRĞh7aİnĄIĆn7ŤRŃR *7 nRV7_jncnĆ7M7ŤRnh7İ ~7 MRnRInRV7nI ~
ŃŤŃIŤİnIln_cŤuŃŤĆnh73ĞŃh7İnRVcRnRV7 [ nİVIĞ * ĆnĆ7M * ch7nRV7nMcĞİ7İnqVŃMVnŃ_ ~7*
nRV7_nRInRV7nİ7 ~chcRŃIŤTn ‘ Q7nVI * ĆnRV7İ7nRhĞRVİnRInŸ7nİ7 *l§7 < ŃĆ7ŤRjnRVcRnc **
n_7Ťnch7nMh7cR7Ćn73Ğc * jnRVcRnRV7 [ nch7n7ŤĆIq7ĆnŸ [nRV7Ńhn -
h7cRIhnqŃRVnM7hRcŃŤnĞŤc * Ń7ŤcŸ *7 nHŃ! VRİjnRVcRnc_IŤ ! nRV7İ7nch7n
Ńl7jn
ŃŸ7hR [ ncŤĆnRV7n ~ ĞhİĞŃRnIln6c ~~ ŃŤ7İİTn§§2VcRnRInİ7MĞh7nRV7İ7nhŃ !VRİjnĄI <7
hŤ_7ŤRİnch7nŃŤİRŃRĞR7Ćnc_IŤ !n?7 ŤjnĆ7hŃ <ŃŤ! nRV7Ńhn@ĞİRn ~
Iq7hİnlhI_nRV7nMIŤİ7ŤRnIlnRV7n !I <7 hŤ7Ćjn§§2VcRnqV7Ť7 <7 hncŤ[ nLIh_nIlnĄI <7
hŤ_7ŤRnŸ7MI_7İnĆ7İRhĞMRŃ <7 nIlnRV7İ7n7ŤĆİjnŃRnŃİnRV7nHŃ ! VRnIlnRV7n ^7I~*7 nRInc *
R7hnIhnRIncŸI * ŃİVnŃRjncŤĆnRInŃŤİRŃRĞR7nŤ7qnĄI <7 hŤ_7ŤRjn *c[ŃŤ!
nŃRİnlIĞŤĆcRŃIŤnIŤnİĞMVn ~ hŃŤMŃ ~*7 İncŤĆnIh ! cŤŃŘŃŤ ! nŃRİn ~
Iq7hİnŃŤnİĞMVnlIh_jncİnRInRV7_nİVc ** nİ77_n_IİRn *Ńu7 *[ nRIn7ll7MRnRV7Ńhn }cl7R[
ncŤĆn6c ~~ ŃŤ7İİTn ^ hĞĆ7ŤM7jnŃŤĆ77ĆjnqŃ ** nĆŃMRcR7nRVcRnĄI <7 hŤ_7ŤRİn *IŤ! n7İRcŸ *
ŃİV7ĆnİVIĞ * ĆnŤIRnŸ7nMVcŤ !7 ĆnlIhn *Ń! VRncŤĆnRhcŤİŃ7ŤRnMcĞİ7İĚncŤĆncMMIhĆŃŤ !*[ nc
** n7 &~7 hŃ7ŤM7nVcRVnİV7qŤjnRVcRn_cŤuŃŤĆnch7n_Ih7nĆŃİ ~ Iİ7ĆnRInİĞll7hjnqVŃ *7n7 <Ń
* İnch7nİĞll7hcŸ *7 jnRVcŤnRInhŃ ! VRnRV7_İ7 *<7 İnŸ[ncŸI* ŃİVŃŤ !
nRV7nlIh_İnRInqVŃMVnRV7 [ nch7ncMMĞİRI_7ĆTnxĞRnqV7Ťncn *IŤ!
nRhcŃŤnIlncŸĞİ7İncŤĆnĞİĞh ~ cRŃIŤİjn ~ ĞhİĞŃŤ !nŃŤ < chŃcŸ *[ nRV7nİc_7n )Ÿ@7MRn7 <
ŃŤM7İncnĆ7İŃ ! ŤnRInh7ĆĞM7nRV7_nĞŤĆ7hncŸİI * ĞR7nb7İ ~ IRŃİ_jnŃRnŃİnRV7ŃhnhŃ !
VRjnŃRnŃİnRV7ŃhnĆĞR [ jnRInRVhIqnIllnİĞMVnĄI <7 hŤ_7ŤRjncŤĆnRIn ~hI <
ŃĆ7nŤ7qnĄĞchĆİnlIhnRV7ŃhnlĞRĞh7nİ7MĞhŃR [Tn§§} ĞMVnVcİnŸ77ŤnRV7n ~
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cRŃ7ŤRnİĞll7hcŤM7nIlnRV7İ7n -I* IŤŃ7İĚncŤĆnİĞMVnŃİnŤIqnRV7nŤ7M7İİŃR [
nqVŃMVnMIŤİRhcŃŤİnRV7_nRInc * R7hnRV7ŃhnlIh_7hn }[ İR7_İnIlnĄI <7
hŤ_7ŤRTn2V7nVŃİRIh [ nIlnRV7n ~ h7İ7ŤRnUŃŤ ! nIlnĄh7cRnxhŃRcŃŤn %Ą7Ih !7
nkkkŔnŃİncnVŃİRIh [ nIlnh7 ~7 cR7ĆnŃŤ@ĞhŃ7İncŤĆnĞİĞh ~ cRŃIŤİjnc **nVc <ŃŤ!
nŃŤnĆŃh7MRnIŸ@7MRnRV7n7İRcŸ * ŃİV_7ŤRnIlncŤncŸİI * ĞR7n2 [hcŤŤ[nI <7 hnRV7İ7n }
RcR7İTn2In ~hI <7 nRVŃİjn *7 RnLcMRİnŸ7nİĞŸ_ŃRR7ĆnRIncnMcŤĆŃĆnqIh *ĆTn ‘67
nVcİnh7lĞİ7ĆnVŃİnCİİ7ŤRnRIn
cqİjnRV7n_IİRnqVI *7 İI_7ncŤĆnŤ7M7İİch [ nlIhnRV7n ~ĞŸ*ŃMn!IIĆTn ‘67
nVcİnlIhŸŃĆĆ7ŤnVŃİnĄI <7 hŤIhİnRIn ~cİİn
cqİnIlnŃ__7ĆŃcR7ncŤĆn ~ h7İİŃŤ !nŃ_~ IhRcŤM7jnĞŤ *7 İİnİĞİ ~7 ŤĆ7ĆnŃŤnRV7ŃhnI ~7 hcRŃIŤnRŃ
** nVŃİnCİİ7ŤRnİVIĞ * ĆnŸ7nIŸRcŃŤ7ĆĚncŤĆnqV7ŤnİInİĞİ ~7 ŤĆ7ĆjnV7nVcİnĞRR7h *[ nŤ7 !*7
MR7ĆnRIncRR7ŤĆnRInRV7_Tn ‘67 nVcİnh7lĞİ7ĆnRIn ~ cİİnIRV7hn
cqİnlIhnRV7ncMMI__IĆcRŃIŤnIln *ch !7 nĆŃİRhŃMRİnIln ~7I~*7 jnĞŤ *7 İİnRVIİ7n ~7I~*7 nqIĞ*
Ćnh7* ŃŤ3ĞŃİVnRV7nhŃ ! VRnIlnH7 ~ h7İ7ŤRcRŃIŤnŃŤnRV7n
7! Ńİ* cRĞh7jncnhŃ ! VRnŃŤ7İRŃ_cŸ *7 nRInRV7_ncŤĆnlIh_ŃĆcŸ *7 nRInR [ hcŤRİnIŤ *[Tn ‘67
nVcİnMc **7 ĆnRI !7 RV7hn *7! Ńİ*cRŃ <7 nŸIĆŃ7İncRn ~* cM7İnĞŤĞİĞc * jnĞŤMI_lIhRcŸ *7
jncŤĆnĆŃİRcŤRnlhI_nRV7nĆ7 ~ IİŃRIh [ nIlnRV7Ńhn ~ĞŸ* ŃMnH7MIhĆİjnlIhnRV7nİI *7n~Ğh~
Iİ7nIlnlcRŃ !ĞŃŤ! nRV7_nŃŤRInMI_ ~* ŃcŤM7nqŃRVnVŃİn_7cİĞh7İTn ‘67 nVcİnĆŃİİI *<7 ĆnH7
~h7İ7ŤRcRŃ <7 n6IĞİ7İnh7 ~7 cR7Ć *[ jnlIhnI ~~ IİŃŤ! nqŃRVn_cŤ *[ nlŃh_Ť7İİnVŃİnŃŤ <
cİŃIŤİnIŤnRV7nhŃ ! VRİnIlnRV7n ~7I~*7Tn ‘67 nVcİnh7lĞİ7ĆnlIhncn *IŤ!
nRŃ_7jnclR7hnİĞMVnĆŃİİI * ĞRŃIŤİjnRInMcĞİ7nIRV7hİnRInŸ7n7 *7 MR7ĆĚnqV7h7Ÿ [ nRV7n
7! Ńİ*cRŃ <7n~ Iq7hİjnŃŤMc ~cŸ *7 nIlnCŤŤŃVŃ *cRŃIŤjnVc <7 nh7RĞhŤ7ĆnRInRV7n ^7I~*7 ncRn*ch
!7 nlIhnRV7Ńhn7 &7 hMŃİ7ĚnRV7n } RcR7nh7_cŃŤŃŤ ! nŃŤnRV7n_7cŤnRŃ_7n7 &~ Iİ7ĆnRInc **
nRV7nĆcŤ !7 hİnIlnŃŤ < cİŃIŤnlhI_nqŃRVIĞRjncŤĆnMIŤ <Ğ* İŃIŤİnqŃRVŃŤTn ‘67 nVcİn7ŤĆ7c <
IĞh7ĆnRIn ~h7 <7 ŤRnRV7n ~I~Ğ* cRŃIŤnIlnRV7İ7n } RcR7İĚnlIhnRVcRn ~Ğh~ Iİ7nIŸİRhĞMRŃŤ !
nRV7n
cqİnlIhntcRĞhc * ŃŘcRŃIŤnIlnLIh7Ń ! Ť7hİĚnh7lĞİŃŤ !nRIn~ cİİnIRV7hİnRIn7ŤMIĞhc !7
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nRV7Ńhn_Ń ! hcRŃIŤİnVŃRV7hjncŤĆnhcŃİŃŤ ! nRV7nMIŤĆŃRŃIŤİnIlnŤ7qnC ~~ hI~
hŃcRŃIŤİnIln
cŤĆİTn ‘67 nVcİnIŸİRhĞMR7ĆnRV7nCĆ_ŃŤŃİRhcRŃIŤnIln ĞİRŃM7jnŸ [ nh7lĞİŃŤ !
nVŃİnCİİ7ŤRnRIn
cqİnlIhn7İRcŸ * ŃİVŃŤ !n ĞĆŃMŃch [n~Iq7hİTn ‘67 nVcİn_cĆ7n ĞĆ !7 İnĆ7 ~7 ŤĆ7ŤRnIŤnVŃİnQŃ **
nc* IŤ7jnlIhnRV7nR7ŤĞh7nIlnRV7ŃhnIllŃM7İjncŤĆnRV7nc_IĞŤRncŤĆn ~c[
_7ŤRnIlnRV7Ńhnİc *chŃ7İTn ‘67 nVcİn7h7MR7Ćncn_Ğ * RŃRĞĆ7nIlnt7qn )
llŃM7İjncŤĆnİ7ŤRnVŃRV7hnİqch_İnIln ) llŃM7hİnRInVchcİİnIĞhn ~7I~*7
jncŤĆn7cRnIĞRnRV7ŃhnİĞŸİRcŤM7Tn ‘67 nVcİnu7 ~ Rnc_IŤ ! nĞİjnŃŤnRŃ_7İnIln ~7 cM7jn }
RcŤĆŃŤ ! nCh_Ń7İnqŃRVIĞRnRV7nMIŤİ7ŤRnIlnIĞhn *7! Ńİ*cRĞh7İTn ‘67
nVcİncll7MR7ĆnRInh7ŤĆ7hnRV7n ?Ń*ŃRch[ nŃŤĆ7 ~7 ŤĆ7ŤRnIlncŤĆnİĞ ~7 hŃIhnRInRV7n -Ń<Ń*
n~Iq7hTn ‘67 nVcİnMI_ŸŃŤ7ĆnqŃRVnIRV7hİnRInİĞŸ@7MRnĞİnRIncn@ĞhŃİĆŃMRŃIŤnlIh7Ń !
ŤnRInIĞhnMIŤİRŃRĞRŃIŤncŤĆnĞŤcMuŤIq *7Ć!7 ĆnŸ[ nIĞhn * cqİĚn !Ń<ŃŤ!
nVŃİnCİİ7ŤRnRInRV7ŃhnCMRİnIln ~ h7R7ŤĆ7Ćn
7! Ńİ*cRŃIŤPn ‘ LIhnŞĞchR7hŃŤ !n*ch !7 nŸIĆŃ7İnIlnch_7ĆnRhII ~ İnc_IŤ !nĞİPn ‘LIhn~ hIR7MRŃŤ
! nRV7_jnŸ [ ncn_IMun2hŃc * jnlhI_n ~ ĞŤŃİV_7ŤRnlIhncŤ [n? ĞhĆ7hİnqVŃMVnRV7 [ nİVIĞ *
ĆnMI__ŃRnIŤnRV7nkŤVcŸŃRcŤRİnIlnRV7İ7n }RcR7İPn ‘ LIhnMĞRRŃŤ !
nIllnIĞhn2hcĆ7nqŃRVnc **n~ chRİnIlnRV7nqIh *ĆPn ‘ LIhnŃ_ ~IİŃŤ!n2c &7
İnIŤnĞİnqŃRVIĞRnIĞhn -IŤİ7ŤRPn ‘ LIhnĆ7 ~hŃ <ŃŤ! nĞİjnŃŤn_cŤ [
nMcİ7İjnIlnRV7nŸ7Ť7lŃRİnIln2hŃc *nŸ[n Ğh[Pn ‘ LIhnRhcŤİ ~ IhRŃŤ ! nĞİnŸ7 [IŤĆn }7
cİnRInŸ7nRhŃ7ĆnlIhn ~ h7R7ŤĆ7ĆnIll7ŤM7İPn ‘ LIhncŸI * ŃİVŃŤ ! nRV7nlh77n }[ İR7_nIlnŮŤ
!* ŃİVn
cqİnŃŤncnŤ7Ń ! VŸIĞhŃŤ !n^hI < ŃŤM7jn7İRcŸ * ŃİVŃŤ ! nRV7h7ŃŤncŤnChŸŃRhch [n!I <7
hŤ_7ŤRjncŤĆn7Ť *ch!ŃŤ! nŃRİnxIĞŤĆchŃ7İnİIncİnRInh7ŤĆ7hnŃRncRnIŤM7ncŤn7 &c_ ~*7
ncŤĆnlŃRnŃŤİRhĞ_7ŤRnlIhnŃŤRhIĆĞMŃŤ ! nRV7nİc_7ncŸİI * ĞR7nhĞ *7 nŃŤRInRV7İ7n -I*
IŤŃ7İPn ‘ LIhnRcuŃŤ !ncqc[nIĞhn - VchR7hİjncŸI * ŃİVŃŤ ! nIĞhn_IİRn <c*ĞcŸ *7n
cqİjncŤĆnc * R7hŃŤ ! nlĞŤĆc_7ŤRc **[ nRV7nLIh_İnIlnIĞhnĄI <7 hŤ_7ŤRİPn ‘ LIhnİĞİ ~7 ŤĆŃŤ!
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nIĞhnIqŤn
7! Ńİ* cRĞh7İjncŤĆnĆ7M *chŃŤ! nRV7_İ7 *<7İnŃŤ <7 İR7ĆnqŃRVn ~ Iq7hnRIn *7! Ńİ*
cR7nlIhnĞİnŃŤnc ** nMcİ7İnqVcRİI7 <7hTn ‘67 nVcİncŸĆŃMcR7ĆnĄI <7 hŤ_7ŤRnV7h7jnŸ [nĆ7M
*chŃŤ! nĞİnIĞRnIlnVŃİn ^ hIR7MRŃIŤncŤĆnqc !ŃŤ! nQchnc ! cŃŤİRnĞİTn ‘67 nVcİn ~*
ĞŤĆ7h7ĆnIĞhnİ7cİjnhc <c!7 ĆnIĞhn - IcİRİjnŸĞhŤRnIĞhnRIqŤİjncŤĆnĆ7İRhI [7 ĆnRV7n *Ń <7
İnIlnIĞhn ~7I~*7Tn ‘67 nŃİncRnRVŃİnRŃ_7nRhcŤİ ~ IhRŃŤ !n*ch !7 nCh_Ń7İnIlnlIh7Ń !Ťn ?7
hM7ŤchŃ7İnRInMI_ ~*7 cRnRV7nqIhuİnIlnĆ7cRVjnĆ7İI * cRŃIŤncŤĆnR [hcŤŤ[jnc*h7cĆ[nŸ7!
ĞŤnqŃRVnMŃhMĞ_İRcŤM7İnIln -hĞ7*R[ ncŤĆn ~7 hlŃĆ[ nİMchM7 *[n~chc **7*7
ĆnŃŤnRV7n_IİRnŸchŸchIĞİnc !7 İjncŤĆnRIRc **[ nĞŤqIhRV [ nRV7n67cĆnIlncnMŃ <Ń*
ŃŘ7ĆnŤcRŃIŤTn ‘67 nVcİnMIŤİRhcŃŤ7ĆnIĞhnl7 **Iqn - ŃRŃŘ7ŤİnRcu7Ťn -c~RŃ <7 nIŤnRV7nVŃ !
Vn }7 cİnRInŸ7chnCh_İnc ! cŃŤİRnRV7Ńhn - IĞŤRh [ jnRInŸ7MI_7nRV7n7 &7
MĞRŃIŤ7hİnIlnRV7ŃhnlhŃ7ŤĆİncŤĆnxh7RVh7ŤjnIhnRInlc ** nRV7_İ7 *<7 İnŸ[
nRV7Ńhn6cŤĆİTn ‘67 nVcİn7 & MŃR7ĆnĆI_7İRŃMnŃŤİĞhh7MRŃIŤİnc_IŤ !
İRnĞİjncŤĆnVcİn7ŤĆ7c < IĞh7ĆnRInŸhŃŤ !
nIŤnRV7nŃŤVcŸŃRcŤRİnIlnIĞhnlhIŤRŃ7hİjnRV7n_7hMŃ *7 İİnkŤĆŃcŤn }c<c!7
İjnqVIİ7nuŤIqŤnhĞ *7 nIlnqchlch7jnŃİncŤnĞŤĆŃİRŃŤ ! ĞŃİV7ĆnĆ7İRhĞMRŃIŤnIlnc ** nc !7
İjnİ7 &7 İncŤĆnMIŤĆŃRŃIŤİTn ‘kŤn7 <7h[nİRc !7 nIlnRV7İ7n )~~ h7İİŃIŤİnQ7nVc <7n^7
RŃRŃIŤ7ĆnlIhnH7Ćh7İİnŃŤnRV7n_IİRnVĞ_Ÿ *7 nR7h_İPn ) Ğhnh7 ~7 cR7Ćn ^7 RŃRŃIŤİnVc <7
nŸ77ŤncŤİq7h7ĆnIŤ *[ nŸ[nh7 ~7 cR7ĆnŃŤ@Ğh [TnCn^
hŃŤM7nqVIİ7nMVchcMR7hnŃİnRVĞİn_chu7ĆnŸ [n7 <7h[ ncMRnqVŃMVn_c [ nĆ7lŃŤ7ncn2 [
hcŤRjnŃİnĞŤlŃRnRInŸ7nRV7nhĞ *7 hnIlncnlh77n ~7I~*7Tn ‘tIhnVc <7 nQ7nŸ77ŤnqcŤRŃŤ !
nŃŤncRR7ŤRŃIŤİnRInIĞhnxhŃRŃİVnŸh7RVh7ŤTnQ7nVc <7
nqchŤ7ĆnRV7_nlhI_nRŃ_7nRInRŃ_7nIlncRR7_ ~RİnŸ[ nRV7Ńhn *7! Ńİ* cRĞh7nRIn7 &
R7ŤĆncŤnĞŤqchhcŤRcŸ *7 n@ĞhŃİĆŃMRŃIŤnI <7 hnĞİTnQ7nVc <7
nh7_ŃŤĆ7ĆnRV7_nIlnRV7nMŃhMĞ_İRcŤM7İnIlnIĞhn7_Ń ! hcRŃIŤncŤĆnİ7RR *7
_7ŤRnV7h7TnQ7nVc <7 nc ~~7c*7 ĆnRInRV7ŃhnŤcRŃ <7 n@ĞİRŃM7ncŤĆn_c ! ŤcŤŃ_ŃR [
jncŤĆnq7nVc <7 nMIŤ@Ğh7ĆnRV7_nŸ [ nRV7nRŃ7İnIlnIĞhnMI__IŤnuŃŤĆh7ĆnRInĆŃİc <
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IqnRV7İ7nĞİĞh ~ cRŃIŤİjnqVŃMVjnqIĞ *ĆnŃŤ7 <ŃRcŸ *[ nŃŤR7hhĞ ~
RnIĞhnMIŤŤ7MRŃIŤİncŤĆnMIhh7İ ~ IŤĆ7ŤM7Tn2V7 [nRIInVc <7 nŸ77ŤnĆ7clnRInRV7n <
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The following C++ computer programs were used to perform encyphering and distribution
counting for the Declaration of Independence examples.
B.1 encypher.cc
// encypher .cc
// runs example cypherings for thesis examples
// by John Szwast
# include <cmath >
# include <stdlib .h>
//# include <stdio .h>
# include <string .h>
# include <iostream >
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//# include <string >
# include <fstream >
# define NUMENCYPHERINGS 4
using namespace std;
int UsageMessage (char* runname );
int FileError (char type);
int main(int argc , char ** argv)
{
ifstream readfile ;
ofstream writefile [ NUMENCYPHERINGS ];
string fileprefix , readfilename , writefilename ;
string writefiles [ NUMENCYPHERINGS ]={" affine ", " digraph ", " vector4graph ", "
vector2graph "};
char ReadChar , WriteChar ;
size_t BytesRead ;
unsigned int p, c, dip [2] , dic [2] , qup [4] , quc [4] , octp [8] , octd [8] , octv [8] , i
, j, k;
unsigned int v2p [2] , v2c [2] , v2i; // vector2graph variables





B.1. ENCYPHER.CC APPENDIX B. COMPUTER CODE
return UsageMessage (argv [0]);
fileprefix = argv [1];
readfilename = fileprefix + ". plaintext .text ";
cout << "File name: " << readfilename << endl;
// open input file
readfile .open( readfilename . c_str () , fstream :: in | fstream :: binary );
if (! readfile . is_open ())
return FileError (1);
for(int counter =0; counter < NUMENCYPHERINGS ; counter ++)
{
writefilename = fileprefix + ’.’ + writefiles [ counter ] + ". text ";
writefile [ counter ]. open( writefilename . c_str () , fstream :: out | fstream :: binary
);




while ( readfile .good ())
{
ReadChar = readfile .get ();
if( readfile .good ())
{
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// Read the next character




// Encypher single character .
c = (53*p + 78) % 128;
WriteChar = (char)c;
if( writefile [0]. good ())
writefile [0]. put( WriteChar );
else
return FileError (3);





ldip =128* dip [0]+ dip [1];
ldic =(((8567* ldip) %16384) + 612) % 16384;
dic [1] = ldic % 128;
ldic = (ldic - dic [1]) / 128;
dic [0] = ldic;
if( writefile [1]. good ())
for(int counter =0; counter < 2; counter ++)
{
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WriteChar = (char)dic[ counter ];










quc [0] = (37* qup [0] + 68* qup [1] + 26* qup [2] + 95* qup [3] + 89) % 128;
quc [1] = (16* qup [0] + 103* qup [1] + 100* qup [2] + 89* qup [3] + 92) % 128;
quc [2] = (122* qup [0] + 33* qup [1] + 17* qup [2] + 51* qup [3] + 59) % 128;
quc [3] = (55* qup [0] + 42* qup [1] + 82* qup [2] + 24* qup [3] + 92) % 128;
if( writefile [2]. good ())
for(int counter =0; counter < 4; counter ++)
{
WriteChar = (char)quc[ counter ];
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// If a digraph is ready , encypher the vector2graph (some redundancy with





v2c [0] = (95 * v2p [0] + 5 * v2p [1] + 43) % 128;
v2c [1] = (97 * v2p [0] + 58 * v2p [1] + 99) % 128;
if( writefile [3]. good ())
for(int counter =0; counter < 2; counter ++)
{
WriteChar = (char)quc[ counter ];







readfile . close ();
for(int counter =0; counter < NUMENCYPHERINGS ; counter ++)
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int UsageMessage (char* runname )
{
cerr << " Usage : " << runname << " <fileprefix >\n" << " Note: fileprefix .
plaintext .text must exist \n";
return 1;
}




cerr << "File input error .\n";
return 2;
}
else if(type == 2)
{
cerr << "File syntax error .\n";
return 3;
}
else if(type == 3)
{





B.2. DISTRIBUTIONCOUNT.CC APPENDIX B. COMPUTER CODE
B.2 distributioncount.cc
// distributioncount .cc
// counts the character distribution of a text file under a specified alphabet
// by John Szwast
//# include <cmath >
# include <stdlib .h>
//# include <stdio .h>
# include <string .h>
# include <iostream >
//# include <string >
# include <fstream >
using namespace std;
int UsageMessage (char* runname );
int FileError (char type);




const char AlphabetMap [3][256] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0 ,65 ,66 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71 ,
72 ,73 ,74 ,75 ,76 ,77 ,78 ,79 ,
80 ,81 ,82 ,83 ,84 ,85 ,86 ,87 , 88 ,89 ,90 , 0, 0, 0,
0, 0,
0 ,65 ,66 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71 ,
72 ,73 ,74 ,75 ,76 ,77 ,78 ,79 ,
80 ,81 ,82 ,83 ,84 ,85 ,86 ,87 , 88 ,89 ,90 , 0, 0, 0,
0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, //26 - letter (A-Z)
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
32, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,39, 0, 0, 0, 0,44, 0,46,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,58, 0, 0, 0,
0,63,
0 ,65 ,66 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71 ,
72 ,73 ,74 ,75 ,76 ,77 ,78 ,79 ,
80 ,81 ,82 ,83 ,84 ,85 ,86 ,87 , 88 ,89 ,90 , 0, 0, 0,
0, 0,
0 ,65 ,66 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71 ,
72 ,73 ,74 ,75 ,76 ,77 ,78 ,79 ,
80 ,81 ,82 ,83 ,84 ,85 ,86 ,87 , 88 ,89 ,90 , 0, 0, 0,
0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, //32 - letter (A-Z ,.? ’:)
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 ,10 ,11 ,12 ,13 ,14 ,15 ,
16 ,17 ,18 ,19 ,20 ,21 ,22 ,23 ,
24 ,25 ,26 ,27 ,28 ,29 ,30 ,31 ,
32 ,33 ,34 ,35 ,36 ,37 ,38 ,39 ,
40 ,41 ,42 ,43 ,44 ,45 ,46 ,47 ,
48 ,49 ,50 ,51 ,52 ,53 ,54 ,55 ,
56 ,57 ,58 ,59 ,60 ,61 ,62 ,63 ,
64 ,65 ,66 ,67 ,68 ,69 ,70 ,71 ,
72 ,73 ,74 ,75 ,76 ,77 ,78 ,79 ,
80 ,81 ,82 ,83 ,84 ,85 ,86 ,87 ,
88 ,89 ,90 ,91 ,92 ,93 ,94 ,95 ,
96 ,97 ,98 ,99 ,100 ,101 ,102 ,103 ,
104 ,105 ,106 ,107 ,108 ,109 ,110 ,111 ,
112 ,113 ,114 ,115 ,116 ,117 ,118 ,119 ,
120 ,121 ,122 ,123 ,124 ,125 ,126 ,127 ,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,





int PrintBounds [3][2] = {64 , 93, 32, 93, 0, 127}; // lower and upper bounds on
each alphabet to be printed
// This helps generate a clean gnuplot histogram .
// Check Usage
if(argc != 3)
return UsageMessage (argv [0]);
Alphabet = atoi(argv [1]);
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filename = argv [2];
cout << "# File name: " << filename << endl;
// open input file
readfile .open( filename . c_str () , fstream :: in | fstream :: binary );
if (! readfile . is_open ())
return FileError (1);
for(int i=0; i <256; i++)
AlphabetDistribution [i] = 0;
while ( readfile .good ())
{
ReadChar = readfile .get ();
if( readfile .good ())
AlphabetDistribution [ AlphabetMap [ Alphabet ][ ReadChar ]]++;
}





// cout << ’ ’;
cout << ’\t’ << AlphabetDistribution [i] << ’\n ’;
}
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readfile . close ();
return 0;
}
int UsageMessage (char* runname )
{
cerr << " Usage : " << runname << " <alphabet > <filename >\ nAlphabet : 0 - 26-
letter (A-Z)\n"
<< " 1 - 32- letter (A-Z ,.? ’:)\n"
<< " 2 - 128 - letter (0 -127)\n";
return 1;
}




cerr << "File input error .\n";
return 2;
}
else if(type == 2)
{
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